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Discounting, On Stilts, Douglas A. Kysar
Discounting, On Stilts, Douglas A. Kysar
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
This paper provides a critical overview of several articles presented at the Intergenerational Discounting and Intergenerational Equity Conference held at the University of Chicago Law School on April 27-28, 2006. First, it demonstrates that conventional normative justifications offered for the use of discounting future costs and benefits for policy analysis in the intergenerational context do not withstand scrutiny. Second, it observes that the compensatory transfers that are sometimes thought to sanitize the cost-benefit procedure in the intergenerational context are deeply problematic, both in their theoretical construction and in their practical adequacy for the tasks they are being deployed to accomplish. …
Soft Regulators, Tough Judges, Gerrit De Geest, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci
Soft Regulators, Tough Judges, Gerrit De Geest, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci
George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series
Judges have a tendency to be more demanding than regulators. In the United States, a majority of the courts has adopted the rule that the unexcused violation of a statutory standard is negligence per se. However, the converse does not hold: compliance with regulation does not relieve the injurer of tort liability. In most European legal systems, the outcome is similar. We use a framework in which, on the one hand, the effects of tort law are undermined by insolvency and evidence problems and, on the other hand, regulation is expensive in terms of monitoring and information gathering. We show …
Disappearing Defendants V. Judgment Proof Injurers: Upgrading The Theory Of Tort Law Failures, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Barbara Mangan
Disappearing Defendants V. Judgment Proof Injurers: Upgrading The Theory Of Tort Law Failures, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Barbara Mangan
George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series
Do injurers’ insolvency and victims’ reluctance to sue affect accident prevention in the same way? Are these circumstances less of a problem under the negligence rule than under strict liability? We argue, contrary to the literature, that the answer is, in most cases, negative and make three main points. First, the judgment proof problem and the disappearing defendant problem are shown to have different effects on injurers’ behavior and hence yield dissimilar levels of social welfare. Second, when these two problems occur simultaneously they may have offsetting effects. Third, the negligence rule is superior to strict liability only under some …
A Culturally Correct Proposal To Privatize The British Columbia Salmon Fishery, D. Bruce Johnsen
A Culturally Correct Proposal To Privatize The British Columbia Salmon Fishery, D. Bruce Johnsen
George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series
Canada now faces two looming policy crises that have come to a head in British Columbia. The first is long-term depletion of the Pacific salmon fishery by mobile commercial ocean fishermen racing to intercept salmon under the rule of capture. The second results from Canadian Supreme Court case law recognizing and affirming “the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada” under Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. This essay shows that the economics of property rights provides a joint solution to these crises that would promote the Canadian commonwealth by way of a privatization auction …
The Regulation Of Green Advertising: The State, The Market And The Environmental Good, David S. Cohen
The Regulation Of Green Advertising: The State, The Market And The Environmental Good, David S. Cohen
Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications
In this paper I explore this most recent development in regulatory policy and, in particular, the role government plays when it chooses to use private markets (consumer, institutional and corporate) as regulatory instruments to produce and allocate environmental benefits. The privatization of environmental regulation by employing markets to deliver environmental benefits does not involve the implementation of public policy through executive or legislative action. Rather, it is achieved through a public choice to privatize the delivery of environmental regulation by permitting or encouraging decentralized economic power to respond to consumer demands for environmental quality.