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Full-Text Articles in Law
Family Law And Entrepreneurial Action, D. Gordon Smith
Family Law And Entrepreneurial Action, D. Gordon Smith
Faculty Scholarship
In "The Contractual Foundation of Family-Business Law," Benjamin Means aspires to lay the groundwork for a law of family businesses. In this brief response essay, I suggest that a workable family-business law along the lines suggested by Means is consistent with an overarching policy in the United States of promoting entrepreneurial action, and I evaluate the proposal against this policy goal, with particular attention to Means’s arguments in favor of “family-business defaults” and his concern over the potentially disruptive role of fiduciary law.
Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding And Online Auction Ipos, A. Christine Hurt
Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding And Online Auction Ipos, A. Christine Hurt
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Law & Entrepreneurship: Do Courts Matter?, D. Gordon Smith, Masako Ueda
Law & Entrepreneurship: Do Courts Matter?, D. Gordon Smith, Masako Ueda
Faculty Scholarship
In this essay, we sketch the outlines of a research agenda exploring links between courts and entrepreneurship. Our conception of law and entrepreneurship encompasses the study of positive law (including constitutions, statutes, and regulations), common law doctrines, and private ordering that relate to the discovery and exploitation of profitable opportunities by new firms. We briefly survey the economics literatures that relate to law and entrepreneurship, including the law and finance literature launched by the work of Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (LLSV). Relying on the suggestive work of LLSV and other economists who have labored …
Team Production In Venture Capital Investing, D. Gordon Smith
Team Production In Venture Capital Investing, D. Gordon Smith
Faculty Scholarship
Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists engage in team production. Inherent in team production is an incentive problem: team members have an incentive to shirk. The incentive to shirk derives from the inability to monitor team members perfectly and compensate them based on productivity. Economic models of team production teach that solutions to shirking must involve (1) a principal (2) with authority to break the budget by realigning the claims of team members through use of a penalty or a bonding arrangement (3) based only on observations of team output, not on monitoring of individual inputs. This paper analyzes the team production …