Law Commons^™

Monopolizing Sports Data, Marc Edelman, John T. Holden

William & Mary Law Review

With legal sports betting viewed as a panacea for state budget woes across the United States, the underlying data that fuels the sports betting industry has emerged as an especially valuable asset. In the hopes of capitalizing on state laws that have now legalized sports betting, United States professional sports leagues have attempted to gain exclusive ownership rights over valuable sports betting data by asking legislators to mandate that bookmakers exclusively use data sold through the league. In addition, some sports leagues have imposed policies mandating that teams bundle together their collected data for purposes of selling it exclusively through …

Alston And The Dejudicialization Of Antitrust, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

A curious feature of NCAA v. Alston is the shoe that didn’t drop, at least not immediately. “Put simply,” Justice Gorsuch wrote for a unanimous Court, “this suit involves admitted horizontal price fixing in a market where the defendants exercise monopoly control.” Given that this pronouncement occurred on page fourteen of the Court’s opinion, one might have expected that the opinion would end on, say, page fifteen, for if there has been one fixed point in American antitrust law it has been that horizontal price-fixing, especially but not only by those with monopoly power, is per se illegal. Instead, the …

The Blue Devil's In The Details: How A Free Market Approach To Compensating College Athletes Would Work, David A. Grenardo

Pepperdine Law Review

Everyone involved in the business of major college athletics, except the athletes, receives compensation based on a free market system. The National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) cap on athlete compensation violates antitrust law, and athletes should be allowed to earn their free market value as everyone else does in this country. This Article provides a detailed approach to compensating college athletes under a free market model, which includes a salary cap, the terms of a proposed standard player’s contract, a discussion of who can represent players, and payment simulations for football and basketball teams. A free market approach would not …

Home-Field Disadvantage: How The Organization Of Soccer In The United States Affects Athletic And Economic Competitiveness, Carolina I. Velarde

Michigan Law Review

The United States men’s soccer team failed to qualify for the 2018 World Cup. In the aftermath, soccer followers questioned the organizational structure supervised by the United States Soccer Federation. An analysis of the relationships between professional soccer leagues reveals potentially anticompetitive practices that may contribute to the subpar performance of the U.S. Men’s National Team. This Note argues that the United States Soccer Federation is engaged in economically anticompetitive behavior that impedes the development of American soccer. Certain reforms, including an open-league system and player transfer fees at the youth development level, would enhance the economic and athletic competitiveness …

Upon Further Review: Reconsidering Clarett And Player Access To The Nfl, Matthew Strauser

Marquette Sports Law Review

None

Player Restraints And Competition Law Throughout The World, Stephen Ross

Stephen F Ross

This article reviews agreements among clubs participating in league sports in many countries throughout the world that limit competition for the services of players. Under the English common law (which governs in most of the British commonwealth), the competition law provisions of the European Union's governing treaty, the American Sherman Act, and the Canadian Competition Act, the governing standard is quite similar. Player restraints cab only be justified if they are related to a legitimate purpose, which is usually defined as one that demonstrably improves the consumer appeal for the sporting competition. Moreover, and significantly, player restraints must be reasonably …

Monopoly Sports Leagues, Stephen Ross

Stephen F Ross

This Article argues that the government should break up both Major League Baseball and the NFL to provide for competing economic entities in each sport. Part I details the harm monopoly sports leagues cause in several different markets and explains why a competitive league structure can correct such harms. Part II discusses why regulatory solutions are poor substitutes for competition as a means of redressing these harms. Part III explains why neither baseball nor football is a "natural monopoly" and argues that no persuasive evidence suggests that rival leagues cannot exist in those sports. Part IV examines how the antitrust …

The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans, Players, And The Antitrust Laws, Stephen Ross

Stephen F Ross

The baseball strike and the ongoing hostilities between the players' association and owners have evoked criticism and frustration among fans and others. Although the players successfully defeated the owners' most recent attempts to reduce major league competition, the threat of future imposition of competitive restraints by the owners remains. In this article Professor Stephen F. Ross argues that blanket restraints on the market for players affirmatively inhibit on-the-field competition and consequently offend the Sherman Act. The article begins with the proposition that monopsony - price-fixing behavior by buyers', rather than sellers' cartels - implicates the Sherman Act. Restraints on competition …

Reconsidering Flood V. Kuhn, Stephen Ross

Stephen F Ross

Within the academia, two very different groups of legal scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to Flood v. Kuhn. Those specializing in sports law have either attached Flood as a ridiculous decision that improperly distinguished between baseball and other professional sports, or have praised it for waging guerrilla warfare on the idea that Section 1 of the Sherman Act should apply to intra-league arrangements by owners of the professional sports teams. Those viewing Flood through the lens of statutory interpretation perceive the decision as adhering rigidly to the principle of stare decisis; this rigidity has been both praised …

An Antitrust Analysis Of Sports League Contracts With Cable Networks, Stephen Ross

Stephen F Ross

This Article discusses the proper antitrust treatment of package sales to cable. Part I considers whether the antitrust laws apply at all to such sales; it concludes that section one of the Sherman Act does apply and that neither the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 not baseball's historic exemption from the antitrust laws prevents antitrust scrutiny of these contracts. Part II explains why cable package sales should be analyzed under a rule of reason test focused on the effect of a sale on fan viewership. Finally, Part III responds to several possible objections to the rule of reason standard proposed …

Accommodating Labor And Antitrust, Stephen Ross

Stephen F Ross

In this article, the author comments on Professor Michael LeRoy's article "Federal Jurisdiction in Sports Labor Disputes" (2012 Utah L. Rev. 815) and explains why he disagrees with the claim that federal courts improperly invoke the Sherman Act in sports labor disputes.

A Rapid Reaction To O'Bannon: The Need For Analytics In Applying The Sherman Act To Overly Restrictive Joint Venture Schemes, Stephen Ross, Wayne Desarbo

Stephen F Ross

This Article reviews the recent and highly publicized district court decision holding that NCAA rules, which bar student-athletes from any compensation for image rights, violated the Sherman Act, and that big-time athletic programs could lawfully agree among themselves to limit compensation to $5,000 annually in trust for each athlete upon leaving school. This Article briefly discusses why the decision correctly found the current rule to be illegal, but also details why, under settled antitrust law, the critical question of how much compensation would significantly harm consumer appeal for college football and basketball is a question better left to marketing science …

A Rapid Reaction To O'Bannon: The Need For Analytics In Applying The Sherman Act To Overly Restrictive Joint Venture Schemes, Stephen F. Ross, Wayne Desarbo

Journal Articles

This Article reviews the recent and highly publicized district court decision holding that NCAA rules, which bar student-athletes from any compensation for image rights, violated the Sherman Act, and that big-time athletic programs could lawfully agree among themselves to limit compensation to $5,000 annually in trust for each athlete upon leaving school. This Article briefly discusses why the decision correctly found the current rule to be illegal, but also details why, under settled antitrust law, the critical question of how much compensation would significantly harm consumer appeal for college football and basketball is a question better left to marketing science …

The Mpaa: A Script For An Antitrust Production, Ian G. Henry

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

Herschel Walker V. National Football League: A Hypothetical Lawsuit Challenging The Propriety Of The National Football League's Four-Or-Five Year Rule Under The Sherman Act, A. Randall Farnsworth

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Reasoning Per Se And Horizontal Price Fixing: An Emerging Trend In Antitrust Litigation?, Joseph W. Defuria Jr.

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Accommodating Labor And Antitrust, Stephen F. Ross

Journal Articles

In this article, the author comments on Professor Michael LeRoy's article "Federal Jurisdiction in Sports Labor Disputes" (2012 Utah L. Rev. 815) and explains why he disagrees with the claim that federal courts improperly invoke the Sherman Act in sports labor disputes.

Shutting The Black Door: Using American Needle To Cure The Problem Of Improper Product Definition, Daniel A. Schwartz

Michigan Law Review

Section 1 of the Sherman Act is designed to protect competition by making illegal any agreement that has the effect of limiting consumer choice. To make this determination, courts first define the product at issue and then consider the challenged restraint's impact on the market in which that product competes. When considering § 1 allegations against sports leagues, courts have tended to define products according to the structure of the leagues. The result of this tendency is that harm to competition between the leagues' teams is not properly accounted for in the courts' analyses. This, in turn, grants leagues a …

The Economics Of Competitive Balance: Sports Antitrust Claims After American Needle, James T. Mckeown

Marquette Sports Law Review

None.

The Nba And The Single Entity Defense: A Better Case?, Michael A. Mccann

Law Faculty Scholarship

This Article will explore the relationship between the National Basketball Association, its independently-owned teams, and associated corporate entities, including the Women’s NBA, NBA Properties, NBA Developmental League, NBA China, and single entity analysis under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 chiefly aims to prevent competitors from combining their economic power in ways that unduly impair competition or harm consumers, be it in terms of raised prices, diminished quality, or limited choices. Single entities are exempt from section 1 because they are considered “one,” rather than competitors, and thus their collaboration does not implicate anticompetitive concerns.

In American Needle …

American Needle V. Nfl: An Opportunity To Reshape Sports Law, Michael Mccann

Law Faculty Scholarship

This Feature will explore American Needle, Inc. v. NFL and its potential impact on professional sports in the United States. In August 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the National Football League (NFL) and its teams operate as a “single entity” for purposes of apparel sales. Because a single entity cannot conspire with itself, it cannot violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits concerted action that unreasonably restrains trade. The U.S. Supreme Court recently granted a writ of certiorari and will review American Needle in its 2009-2010 Term. As this Feature …

Solidifying The Defensive Line: The Nfl Network's Current Position Under Antitrust Law And How It Can Be Improved, Ethan Flatt

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

In the United States, the broadcasting of professional sporting events is a multi-billion dollar industry, and the National Football League (NFL) alone earned more than $3 billion from television contracts during its 2008 season. Considering the massive revenues that broadcast rights can generate, it is no surprise that some major professional sports leagues have recently developed their own television networks. While it was not the first league-owned television network, the NFL Network has certainly generated the most attention. Since it started broadcasting a select number of NFL regular season games in 2006, the NFL Network has been subject to media …

Is The Ncaa Prohibition Of Native American Mascots From Championship Play A Violation Of The Sherman Antitrust Act, Ryan Fulda

American Indian Law Review

No abstract provided.

Player Restraints And Competition Law Throughout The World, Stephen F. Ross

Journal Articles

This article reviews agreements among clubs participating in league sports in many countries throughout the world that limit competition for the services of players. Under the English common law (which governs in most of the British commonwealth), the competition law provisions of the European Union's governing treaty, the American Sherman Act, and the Canadian Competition Act, the governing standard is quite similar. Player restraints cab only be justified if they are related to a legitimate purpose, which is usually defined as one that demonstrably improves the consumer appeal for the sporting competition. Moreover, and significantly, player restraints must be reasonably …

The Empire Strikes Back: Nfl Cuts Clarett, Sacks Scheindlin, Adam Epstein

Adam Epstein

The article explores and the litigation history involving former Ohio State University running back Maurice Clarett and his challenge the the NFL draft-eligibility rule. Though Clarett was successful at the U.S. District Court level, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled differently, thereby preventing Clarett from being eligible for the 2004 NFL draft. Though he was drafted the next year (2005), an exploration of the differences between the trial court (Hon. Schendlin) and the appellate court (J. Sotomayor) opinions is quite interesting and relevant in the context of both antitrust and labor law, particularly the mandatory subjects of a collective …

Player Restraints And Competition Law Throughout The World, Stephen F. Ross

Marquette Sports Law Review

No abstract provided.

If Per Se Is Dying, Why Not In Tv Tying? A Case For Adopting The Rule Of Reason Standard In Television Block- Booking Arrangements, Nicole Labletta

Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Reevaluating Amateurism Standards In Men's College Basketball, Marc Edelman

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note argues that courts should interpret NCAA conduct under the Principle of Amateurism as a violation of§ 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and that courts should order NCAA deregulation of student-athletes' indirect financial activities. Part I of this Note discusses the history of NCAA regulation, specifically its Principle of Amateurism. Part II discusses the current impact of antitrust laws on the NCAA. Part III argues that the NCAA violates antitrust laws because the Principle of Amateurism's overall effect is anticompetitive. Part IV argues the NCAA could institute an amateurism standard with a net pro-competitive effect by allowing student-athletes …

The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans, Players, And The Antitrust Laws, Stephen F. Ross

Journal Articles

The baseball strike and the ongoing hostilities between the players' association and owners have evoked criticism and frustration among fans and others. Although the players successfully defeated the owners' most recent attempts to reduce major league competition, the threat of future imposition of competitive restraints by the owners remains. In this article Professor Stephen F. Ross argues that blanket restraints on the market for players affirmatively inhibit on-the-field competition and consequently offend the Sherman Act.

The article begins with the proposition that monopsony - price-fixing behavior by buyers', rather than sellers' cartels - implicates the Sherman Act. Restraints on competition …

Reconsidering Flood V. Kuhn, Stephen F. Ross

Journal Articles

Within the academia, two very different groups of legal scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to Flood v. Kuhn. Those specializing in sports law have either attached Flood as a ridiculous decision that improperly distinguished between baseball and other professional sports, or have praised it for waging guerrilla warfare on the idea that Section 1 of the Sherman Act should apply to intra-league arrangements by owners of the professional sports teams. Those viewing Flood through the lens of statutory interpretation perceive the decision as adhering rigidly to the principle of stare decisis; this rigidity has been …