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Good For You, Bad For Us: The Financial Disincentive For Net Demand, Jim Rossi, Michael P. Vandenbergh
Good For You, Bad For Us: The Financial Disincentive For Net Demand, Jim Rossi, Michael P. Vandenbergh
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This Article examines a principal barrier to reducing U.S. carbon emissions — electricity distributors’ financial incentives to sell more of their product — and introduces the concept of net demand reduction (“NDR”) as a primary goal for the modern energy regulatory system. Net electricity demand must decrease substantially from projected levels for the United States to achieve widely-endorsed carbon targets by 2050. Although social and behavioral research has identified cost-effective ways to reduce electricity demand, state-of-the-art programs to curtail demand have not been implemented on a widespread basis. We argue that electric distribution utilities are important gatekeepers that can determine …
Good For You, Bad For Us: The Financial Disincentive For Net Demand Reduction, Michael P. Vandenbergh, Jim Rossi
Good For You, Bad For Us: The Financial Disincentive For Net Demand Reduction, Michael P. Vandenbergh, Jim Rossi
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This Article examines a principal barrier to reducing U.S. carbon emissions — electricity distributors’ financial incentives to sell more of their product — and introduces the concept of net demand reduction (“NDR”) as a primary goal for the modern energy regulatory system. Net electricity demand must decrease substantially from projected levels for the United States to achieve widely-endorsed carbon targets by 2050. Although social and behavioral research has identified cost-effective ways to reduce electricity demand, state-of-the-art programs to curtail demand have not been implemented on a widespread basis. We argue that electric distribution utilities are important gatekeepers that can determine …
The Irony Of Deregulatory Takings, Jim Rossi
The Irony Of Deregulatory Takings, Jim Rossi
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This is a critical review essay, exploring the thesis advanced by Gregory Sidak and Daniel Spulber in their book Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract (Cambridge University Press 1997). Sidak and Spulber argue that deregulation of the electric utility and local telephony industries can constitute an unconstitutional taking to the extent the state does not provide compensation for the investment-backed expectations of firms in the industry. In addition, they argue that economic efficiency requires this result. This review takes Sidak and Spulber to task for their reading of the case law. In addition, the review criticizes their argument for giving …