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Shareholder Proposal Settlements And The Private Ordering Of Public Elections, Sarah C. Haan Dec 2017

Shareholder Proposal Settlements And The Private Ordering Of Public Elections, Sarah C. Haan

Sarah Haan

Reform of campaign finance disclosure has stalled in Congress and at various federal agencies, but it is steadily unfolding in a firm-by-firm program of private ordering. Today, much of what is publicly known about how individual public companies spend money to influence federal, state, and local elections—and particularly what is known about corporate “dark money”—comes from disclosures that conform to privately negotiated contracts.

The primary mechanism for this new transparency is the settlement of the shareholder proposal, in which a shareholder trades its rights under SEC Rule 14a-8—and potentially the rights of other shareholders—for a privately negotiated social policy commitment …


The Ceo And The Hydraulics Of Campaign Finance Deregulation, Sarah C. Haan Sep 2017

The Ceo And The Hydraulics Of Campaign Finance Deregulation, Sarah C. Haan

Sarah Haan

Voters increasingly view their consumer activities, not their campaign contributions, as the most meaningful way to participate in politics. In 2014, after it became public that Mozilla’s CEO, Brendan Eich, had made a controversial political donation in a state ballot proposition, consumer pressure led to his resignation. Eich’s downfall and the politicization of retail markets means that business leaders are unlikely to respond to McCutcheon v. FEC by embracing transparency with their campaign donations, and also suggests that campaign finance deregulation is causing hydraulic effects that the Supreme Court has failed to anticipate. This Essay explores what “economic reprisal” means …


Voter Primacy, Sarah C. Haan Sep 2017

Voter Primacy, Sarah C. Haan

Sarah Haan

This Article argues that Citizens United v. FEC expanded the audience for campaign finance disclosure to include a group that had never before been held relevant to campaign finance disclosure—corporate shareholders—and explores the constitutional, policy, and political consequences of this change. In part IV of Citizens United, the U.S. Supreme Court departed from more than thirty years of campaign finance disclosure analysis to treat corporate shareholders as a target audience for corporate electoral spending disclosure, holding that the governmental interest advanced by campaign finance disclosure laws includes an interest in helping corporate shareholders “determine whether their corporation’s political speech advances …