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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Law
A No-Tribunal Sdrm And The Means Of Binding Creditors To The Terms Of A Restructuring Plan, Charles W. Mooney Jr.
A No-Tribunal Sdrm And The Means Of Binding Creditors To The Terms Of A Restructuring Plan, Charles W. Mooney Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
The paper addresses two discrete but related and essential attributes of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM). It first considers the merits and feasibility of an SDRM that would provide a procedure for proposing and adopting a restructuring plan for a sovereign debtor’s debt which would not involve any tribunal or administrator (a No-Tribunal SDRM). The No-Tribunal SDRM would undertake the restructuring as if the sovereign debtor and its creditors were subject to the Model CAC regime. In addition to embodying a novel and interesting structure for an SDRM—and one that eliminates the difficult hurdle of identifying a satisfactory tribunal—adoption …
Empirical Study Redux On Choice Of Law And Forum In M&A: The Data And Its Limits, Juliet P. Kostritsky, Wojbor Woyczynski, Harold Haller, Kyle Chen
Empirical Study Redux On Choice Of Law And Forum In M&A: The Data And Its Limits, Juliet P. Kostritsky, Wojbor Woyczynski, Harold Haller, Kyle Chen
Juliet P Kostritsky
No abstract provided.
The Rome I Regulation Rules On Party Autonomy For Choice Of Law: A U.S. Perspective, Ronald A. Brand
The Rome I Regulation Rules On Party Autonomy For Choice Of Law: A U.S. Perspective, Ronald A. Brand
Articles
This chapter was presented at a conference in Dublin on the (then) new Rome I Regulation of the European Union in the fall of 2009. It contrasts the Rome I rules on party autonomy with those in the United States. In particular, it considers the rules in the Rome I Regulation that ostensibly protect consumers by discouraging party agreement on a pre-dispute basis to the law governing a consumer contract. These rules are compared with the absence of private international law restrictions on choice of forum and choice of law in the United States, even in consumer contracts. The result …
Reducing The Impact Of Ethnic Tensions On Economic Growth – Economic Or Political Institutions?, Atin Basu Choudhary, Jim Bang, Michael Reksulak
Reducing The Impact Of Ethnic Tensions On Economic Growth – Economic Or Political Institutions?, Atin Basu Choudhary, Jim Bang, Michael Reksulak
Atin Basu Choudhary
We use a standard growth regression model and show that ethnic tensions reduce per capita growth rates. We also find evidence that “good” economic and political institutions improve per capita growth rates. More importantly, good economic institutions mitigate the effect of ethnic tensions on per capita growth while good political institutions do not. Consequently, it is foremost capitalist freedom that promotes peace and development.
The European Magnet And The U.S. Centrifuge: Ten Selected Private International Law Developments Of 2008, Ronald A. Brand
The European Magnet And The U.S. Centrifuge: Ten Selected Private International Law Developments Of 2008, Ronald A. Brand
Articles
This article considers ten developments in private international law that occurred in 2008. In doing so, it focuses on the way in which these developments demonstrate a parallel convergence of power for private international in the institutions of the European Community and dispersal of power for private international law in the United States. This process carries with it important implications for the future roles of both the European Union and the United States in the multilateral development of rules of private international law, with the EU moving toward an enhanced leadership role and the United States restricting its own ability …
The Economics Of Private Law Harmonization, John Linarelli
The Economics Of Private Law Harmonization, John Linarelli
Scholarly Works
No abstract provided.