Law Commons^™

International Comparisons Of Bank Regulation, Liberalization, And Banking Crises, Puspa Amri, Apanard P. Angkinand, Clas Wihlborg

Business Faculty Articles and Research

Purpose: The recurrence of banking crises throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and in the more recent 2008-09 global financial crisis, has led to an expanding empirical literature on crisis explanation and prediction. This paper provides an analytical review of proxies for and important determinants of banking crises − credit growth, financial liberalization, bank regulation and supervision.

Design/Methodology/Approach: The study surveys the banking crisis literature by comparing proxies for and measures of banking crises and policy-related variables in the literature. Advantages and disadvantages of different proxies are discussed.

Findings: Disagreements about determinants of banking crises are in part …

Financial Liberalization And Banking Crises: A Cross-Country Analysis, Apanard P. Angkinand, Wanvimol Sawangngoenyuang, Clas Wihlborg

Business Faculty Articles and Research

Several studies indicate that financial liberalization contributes to the likelihood of a financial crisis. We focus on banking crises and argue that they are most likely to occur after an intermediate degree of liberalization. Using a recently updated dataset for financial reforms in 48 countries between 1973 and 2005, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between liberalization and the likelihood of crisis. We ask whether the relationship remains when institutional characteristics of countries and dynamic effects of liberalization are considered. The empirical results indicate that the relationship between liberalization and banking crises depends strongly on the strength of capital regulation …

Deposit Insurance Coverage, Ownership, And Banks' Risk-Taking In Emerging Markets, Apanard P. Angkinand, Clas Wihlborg

Business Faculty Articles and Research

We ask how deposit insurance systems and ownership of banks affect the degree of market discipline on banks' risk-taking. Market discipline is determined by the extent of explicit deposit insurance, as well as by the credibility of non-insurance of groups of depositors and other creditors. Furthermore, market discipline depends on the ownership structure of banks and the responsiveness of bank managers to market incentives. An expected U-shaped relationship between explicit deposit insurance coverage and banks' risk-taking is influenced by country specific institutional factors, including bank ownership. We analyze specifically how government ownership, foreign ownership and shareholder rights affect the disciplinary …

On The Macroeconomic Effects Of Establishing Tradability In Weak Property Rights, Gunnar Eliasson, Clas Wihlborg

Business Faculty Articles and Research

The New Economy is closely associated with computing & communications technology, notably the Internet. We discuss property rights to, and trade in, the difficult-to-define intangible assets increasingly dominating the New Economy, and the possibility of under-investment in these assets. For a realistic analysis we introduce a Schumpeterian market environment (the experimentally organized economy). Weak property rights prevail when the rights to access, use, andtrade in intangible assets cannot be fully exercised. The trade-off between the benefits of open access on the Internet, and the incentive effects of strengthened property rights, depend both on the particular strategy a firm employs to …

The New Basel Capital Accord: Making It Effective With Stronger Market Discipline, Harald Benink, Clas Wihlborg

Business Faculty Articles and Research

In January 2001 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision proposed a new capital adequacy framework to respond to deficiencies in the 1988 Capital Accord on credit risk. The main elements or ‘pillars’ of the proposal are capital requirements based on the internal risk-ratings of individual banks, expanded and active supervision, and information disclosure requirements to enhance market discipline. We discuss the incentive effects of the proposed regulation. In particular, we argue that it provides incentives for banks to develop new ways to evade the intended consequences of the proposed regulation. Supervision alone cannot prevent banks from ‘gaming and manipulation’ of …