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Economics

Selected Works

Selected Works

2013

Corporations

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Janus Capital Group, Inc. V. First Derivative Traders: The Culmination Of The Supreme Court’S Evolution From Liberal To Reactionary In Rule 10b-5 Actions, Charles W. Murdock Feb 2013

Janus Capital Group, Inc. V. First Derivative Traders: The Culmination Of The Supreme Court’S Evolution From Liberal To Reactionary In Rule 10b-5 Actions, Charles W. Murdock

Charles W. Murdock

“Political” decisions such as Citizens United and National Federation of Independent Business (“Obamacare”) reflect the reactionary bent of several Supreme Court justices. But this reactionary trend is discernible in other areas as well. With regard to Rule 10b-5, the Court has handed down a series of decisions that could be grouped into four trilogies. The article examines the trend over the past 40 years which has become increasingly conservative and finally reactionary.

The first trilogy was a liberal one, arguably overextending the scope of Rule 10b-5. This was followed by a conservative trilogy which put a brake on such extension, …


Csr And Law As Alternative Regulatory Systems, Benedict Sheehy Feb 2013

Csr And Law As Alternative Regulatory Systems, Benedict Sheehy

Benedict Sheehy

Abstract: CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) is an increasingly important area of corporate and legal concern. In addition to problems defining the meaning of the term and understanding the implications for, there is a lack of understanding how it can, does and should interact with law. This paper answers this gap using a method used in the sociology of law, systems theory. The paper argues that CSR can be understood as a response to social costs and law’s apparent failure to curb those costs. It focuses the examination on social costs generated by large industrial organisations and how they are regulated …


The Law Of Corporate Purpose, David Yosifon Jan 2013

The Law Of Corporate Purpose, David Yosifon

David G. Yosifon

Delaware corporate law requires corporate directors to manage firms for the benefit of shareholders, and not for any other constituency. Delaware jurists have been clear about this in their case law, and they are not coy about it in extra-judicial settings, such as speeches directed at law students and practicing members of the corporate bar. Nevertheless, the reader of leading corporate law scholarship is continually exposed to the scholarly assertion that the law is ambiguous or ambivalent on this point, or even that case law affirmatively empowers directors to pursue non-shareholder interests. It is shocking, and troubling, for corporate law …