Law Commons^™

Barreras A La Competencia Y Libre Concurrencia E Insumos Esenciales, Carlos Mena-Labarthe

Carlos Mena-Labarthe

En la Constitución Mexicana y la Ley Federal de Competencia Económica se establecen facultades para que la autoridad de competencia elimine barreras y regule insumos.

Las investigaciones de mercado son una herramienta adicional que permite obtener una perspectiva integral de los mercados para la corrección de fallas conductuales y estructurales.

Se trata de un procedimiento muy riguroso con plazos establecidos para su ejecución.

Las investigaciones de mercado han resultado exitosas en otras jurisdicciones con una sólida tradición en competencia económica.

Rise Of The Intercontinentalexchange And Implications Of Its Merger With Nyse Euronext, Latoya C. Brown

Latoya C. Brown, Esq.

This paper examines the impending merger between the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) and NYSE Euronext against the backdrop of the current structure of the global financial services industry. The paper concludes that the merger embodies what the financial services industry is becoming and captures the model that will allow exchanges to remain competitive in today’s marketplace: mega-exchanges with broader asset classes and electronic platforms. As technology and globalization threaten their vitality, exchanges will need to continue reinventing and adapting. Increasingly over the last decade they have done so by merging and by moving, at least a part of, their operations on screen. …

The Competition Act Of 2010: What Effect Will The Act Likely Have On The Supply And Prices Of Goods And Services In Malaysia?, Bryane Michael

Bryane Michael (bryane.michael@stcatz.ox.ac.uk)

This presentation provides an overview of the likely effects of Malaysia's 2010 Competition Act.

Freedom To Trade And The Competitive Process, Aaron S. Edlin, Joseph Farrell

Aaron Edlin

Although antitrust courts sometimes stress the competitive process, they have not deeply explored what that process is. Inspired by the theory of the core, we explore the idea that the competitive process is the process of sellers and buyers forming improving coalitions. Much of antitrust can be seen as prohibiting firms’ attempts to restrain improving trade between their rivals and customers. In this way, antitrust protects firms’ and customers’ freedom to trade to their mutual betterment.

Standardization As A Solution To The Reading Costs Of Form Contracts, Abraham L. Wickelgren

Abraham L. Wickelgren

It is well-known that a monopolist cannot commit to offer a high quality contract to a consumer reading costs are postive. This paper shows that this also holds in a competitive environment with consumer heterogeneity if the contract space is unrestricted. If firms can offer standardized contracts from a finite set, however, each with a standardized name, this paper shows that, when reading costs are not too large, there exists an equilibrium in which firms offer the most efficient contracts from the set of named contracts and consumers purchase the most efficient contracts offered without incurring any reading costs.

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom, Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Paolo Santella

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on director interlocks by illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships among the Italian, French, German, UK and US listed Blue Chips. The comparison of the five countries considered shows that two national models stand out. On the one hand a model made of a high number of companies linked to each other through a small number of shared directors who serve on several company boards at the time (France, Germany, and Italy). On the other hand, in the UK much fewer companies are connected to each other essentially through …

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom, Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Carlo Drago

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on director interlocks by illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships among the Italian, French, German, UK and US listed Blue Chips. The comparison of the five countries considered shows that two national models stand out. On the one hand a model made of a high number of companies linked to each other through a small number of shared directors who serve on several company boards at the time (France, Germany, and Italy). On the other hand, in the UK much fewer companies are connected to each other essentially through …

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.

Healthy Competition: What’S Holding Back Health Care And How To Free It, Michael F. Cannon

Michael F. Cannon

No abstract provided.

Guilds, Laws, And Markets For Manufactured Merchandise In Late-Medieval England, Gary Richardson

Gary Richardson

The prevailing paradigm of medieval manufacturing presumes guilds monopolized markets for durable goods in late-medieval England. The sources of the monopolies are said to have been the charters of towns, charters of guilds, parliamentary statutes, and judicial precedents. This essay examines those sources, demonstrates they did not give guilds legal monopolies in the modern sense of the word, and replaces that erroneous assumption with an accurate description of the legal institutions underlying markets for manufactures in medieval England.