Law Commons^™

Airline Network Effects And Consumer Welfare, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Mark Israel, Bryan Keating, Bobby Willig

Daniel L. Rubinfeld

In this paper we develop a methodology to quantify the value to consumers of the non-price characteristics of airline networks. Our research demonstrates that analyses that ignore the quality effects associated with expanded airline networks generate incorrect findings and thus should not form the basis for policy decisions regarding airline transactions. Appropriately incorporating quality effects into quality-adjusted fares reverses the conclusion that hub airports yield lower consumer welfare due to generally higher fares than other airports. From the perspective of consumer welfare in this industry, to evaluate potential airline mergers, alliances, slot swaps or other transactions, one should not focus …

Freedom To Trade And The Competitive Process, Aaron S. Edlin, Joseph Farrell

Aaron Edlin

Although antitrust courts sometimes stress the competitive process, they have not deeply explored what that process is. Inspired by the theory of the core, we explore the idea that the competitive process is the process of sellers and buyers forming improving coalitions. Much of antitrust can be seen as prohibiting firms’ attempts to restrain improving trade between their rivals and customers. In this way, antitrust protects firms’ and customers’ freedom to trade to their mutual betterment.

The Role Of Switching Costs In Antitrust Analysis: A Comparison Of Microsoft And Google, Aaron Edlin, Robert Harris

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

Predatory Pricing, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

Judge Breyer famously worried that aggressive prohibitions of predatory pricing throw away a bird in hand (low prices during the alleged predatory period) for a speculative bird in the bush (preventing higher prices thereafter). Here, I argue that there is no bird in hand because entry cannot be presumed. Moreover, it is plausibly commonplace that low prices or the threat of low prices produce anticompetitive results by reducing entry, inducing exit, and keeping prices high. I analyze three potential standards for identifying predatory pricing. Two are traditional but have been tangled together and must be distinguished. First, a price-cost test …

2011 Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis, Problems, Text, And Cases, Philip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

Proposed Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Economists’ Comment, Michael R. Baye, Aaron S. Edlin, Richard J. Gilbert, Jerry A. Hausman, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Steven C. Salop, Richard L. Schmalensee, Joshua D. Wright

Richard Gilbert

No abstract provided.

Proposed Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Economists’ Comment, Michael R. Baye, Aaron S. Edlin, Richard J. Gilbert, Jerry A. Hausman, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Steven C. Salop, Richard L. Schmalensee, Joshua D. Wright

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

Academic Testimony On Unilateral Conduct Before The U.S. Dept. Of Justice & Federal Trade Commission Hearings, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

The Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Daniel L. Rubinfeld

No abstract provided.

The Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

Exclusion Or Efficient Pricing: The "Big Deal" Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Prices of academic journals have climbed enormously in the past two decades. This article explains the substantial barriers to entry that established journals enjoy. It points out that the Big Deal bundling that the large commercial publishers have adopted in the past few years creates a substantial additional strategic barrier to entry. We consider whether these bundling offers violate the antitrust laws and conclude that they may.

Exclusion Or Efficient Pricing: The "Big Deal" Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Aaron Edlin

Prices of academic journals have climbed enormously in the past two decades. This article explains the substantial barriers to entry that established journals enjoy. It points out that the Big Deal bundling that the large commercial publishers have adopted in the past few years creates a substantial additional strategic barrier to entry. We consider whether these bundling offers violate the antitrust laws and conclude that they may.

The American Airlines Case: A Chance To Clarify Predation Policy, Aaron S. Edlin, Joseph Farrell

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

Recent Initiatives In Antitrust Enforcement, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

Do Guaranteed-Low-Price Policies Guarantee High Prices, And Can Antitrust Rise To The Challenge?, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

Price-matching policies can be highly anticompetitive. They allow firms to raise their prices above competition levels by discriminating in price between informed and uninformed customers. The resulting high prices can persist even when new firms enter the industry, a fact that gives price matching the potential to be much more socially costly than an ordinary monopoly or cartel. At the same time, widespread entry implies that the agreement among sellers that is typical of a Sherman Act price-fixing case may be absent. In this article, Professor Edlin argues that there is nonetheless an analogy between a seller offering (and agreeing) …