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Full-Text Articles in Law

What Economists Really Know, And What They Don't, Richard Adelstein Oct 2010

What Economists Really Know, And What They Don't, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A PowerPoint presentation on what it's possible for economists to know. A video of the lecture is accessible at: https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/what-economists-really-know-and-what-they-dont-feb-23-2011/id427787563?i=1000092352244&mt=2


A Logica De Acumulação Capitalista E O Racionamento Da Oferta De Crédito, Amilton Bispo Dos Reis Mar 2010

A Logica De Acumulação Capitalista E O Racionamento Da Oferta De Crédito, Amilton Bispo Dos Reis

Amilton Bispo dos Reis

Este texto deriva da dissertação de mestrado do autor - Crédito para MPES: Análise da Experiência Brasileira Recente - e pretende analisar o atendimento à demanda de crédito das micro e pequenas empresas por parte do sistema bancário, enfatizando as peculiaridades do mercado brasileiro, com o objetivo de identificar em que medida esse caso particular se aproxima ou se afasta do padrão geral apresentado no resto do mundo. Parte-se dos conceitos expostos por Marx sobre o desenvolvimento do sistema de crédito, demonstrando a sua importância fundamental no processo de reprodução do capital. Posteriormente, a partir da constatação de que as …


Patent Examination Policy And The Social Costs Of Examiner Allowance And Rejection Errors, Ron D. Katznelson Feb 2010

Patent Examination Policy And The Social Costs Of Examiner Allowance And Rejection Errors, Ron D. Katznelson

Ron D. Katznelson

No abstract provided.


The Coasean Analysis Of Harmful Interactions: Some Conceptual Difficulties, Satish K. Jain Jan 2010

The Coasean Analysis Of Harmful Interactions: Some Conceptual Difficulties, Satish K. Jain

Satish K. Jain

This paper is concerned with two distinct issues flowing from Coase's analysis of harmful interactions and of how courts deal with them. The first issue relates to the domain of validity of the Coase Theorem. It is argued in the paper that if non-pecuniary considerations are brought into the analysis then it can no longer be claimed that the outcome will be efficient regardless of liability assignments. In other words, it is contended in the paper that the validity of the Coase Theorem is crucially dependent on neglect of non-pecuniary considerations from the analysis. From this it follows that if …


Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac: Creatures Of Regulatory Privilege, David J. Reiss Jan 2010

Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac: Creatures Of Regulatory Privilege, David J. Reiss

David J Reiss

This book chapter addresses the appropriate role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-chartered, privately owned mortgage finance companies, in the United States housing finance sector. The federal government recently placed Fannie and Freddie in conservatorship. These two massive companies are profit-driven, but as government-sponsored enterprises they also have a government-mandated mission to provide liquidity and stability to the United States mortgage market and to achieve certain affordable housing goals. How the two companies should exit their conservatorship has implications that reach throughout the global financial markets and are of key importance to the future of American housing finance …


Monitoring Managers Through Corporate Compliance Programs, Charles Angelucci, Martijn Han Dec 2009

Monitoring Managers Through Corporate Compliance Programs, Charles Angelucci, Martijn Han

Martijn A. Han

Compliance programs entail monitoring of employees' behavior with the claimed objective of fighting corporate crime. (Competition) Authorities promote such intra-firm monitoring. In a three-tier hierarchy model, authority-shareholder-manager, we study the impact of monitoring through a compliance program on contracting within the firm and the authority's optimal sanctions and leniency policy. We find that compliance programs are beneficial in the fight against corporate crime if and only if the managerial sanction is low. Moreover, when the shareholder blows the whistle, the authority optimally grants partial corporate leniency, while not granting individual leniency to the involved employees. Conversely, when the employee blows …


Firms As Social Actors, Richard Adelstein Dec 2009

Firms As Social Actors, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A close look at what firms are and how they act.


Organizations And Economics, Richard Adelstein Dec 2009

Organizations And Economics, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A contribution to a symposium on a paper by Richard Posner.


Black Tuesday And Graying The Legitimacy Line For Governmental Intervention: When Tomorrow Is Just A Future Yesterday, Donald J. Kochan Dec 2009

Black Tuesday And Graying The Legitimacy Line For Governmental Intervention: When Tomorrow Is Just A Future Yesterday, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

Black Tuesday in October 1929 marked a major crisis in American history. As we face current economic woes, it is appropriate to recall not only the event but also reflect on how it altered the legal landscape and the change it precipitated in the acceptance of governmental intervention into the marketplace. Perceived or real crises can cause us to dance between free markets and regulatory power. Much like the events of 1929, current financial concerns have led to new, unprecedented governmental intervention into the private sector. This Article seeks caution, on the basis of history, arguing that fear and crisis …