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Why Economic Performance Has Differed Between Brazil And China? A Comparative Analysis Of Brazilian And Chinese Macroeconomic Policy, Fernando Ferrari-Filho, Anthony Petros Spanakos Jun 2009

Why Economic Performance Has Differed Between Brazil And China? A Comparative Analysis Of Brazilian And Chinese Macroeconomic Policy, Fernando Ferrari-Filho, Anthony Petros Spanakos

Department of Political Science and Law Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works

This paper addresses a specific question: why has China grown so rapidly and Brazil not? To answer this question, it (i) establishes the basis for comparison between China and Brazil by contextualizing these countries within the BRICs concept, and (ii) presents a comparative analysis of Brazilian and Chinese reforms focusing only on the issue of macroeconomic policy, especially the monetary and exchange rate regimes, and its effect on growth.


Elections And Economic Turbulence In Brazil: Candidates, Voters, And Investors, Tony Petros Spanakos, Lucio R. Renno Dec 2008

Elections And Economic Turbulence In Brazil: Candidates, Voters, And Investors, Tony Petros Spanakos, Lucio R. Renno

Department of Political Science and Law Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works

The relation between elections and the economy in Latin America might be understood by considering the agency of candidates and the issue of policy preference congruence between investors and voters. The preference congruence model proposed in this article highlights political risk in emerging markets. Certain risk features increase the role of candidate campaign rhetoric and investor preferences in elections. When politicians propose policies that can appease voters and investors, elections may have a limited effect on economic indicators, such as inflation. But when voter and investor priorities differ significantly, deterioration of economic indicators is more likely. Moreover, voter and investor …


Why Brazil Has Not Grown: A Comparative Analysis Of Brazilian, Indian, And Chinese Economic Management, Fernando Ferrari, Anthony Petros Spanakos Mar 2008

Why Brazil Has Not Grown: A Comparative Analysis Of Brazilian, Indian, And Chinese Economic Management, Fernando Ferrari, Anthony Petros Spanakos

Department of Political Science and Law Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works

This paper does not aim to dispute that Brazil would benefit from reforms in any or all of these areas. Rather, the paper offers a skeptical perspective on reform menus and proposes an alternative explanation for the faster growth of Brazil’s peers India and China2. The paper begins by introducing (section 1) the idea of the BRICs countries, to establish the basis for comparisons of most similar cases. It then surveys the results of a generation of Washington Consensus era growth (section 2). Although there is a considerable amount of divergence over what causes growth, it seems that something approaching …


Reform In Lieu Of Change: Tastes Great, Less Filling, Jonathan G.S. Koppell Jan 2006

Reform In Lieu Of Change: Tastes Great, Less Filling, Jonathan G.S. Koppell

Publications from President Jonathan G.S. Koppell

In this response to Light, Koppell argues that the increasing frequency of reform may reflect Congress's inability to make significant changes to the substance of entrenched government programs. Moreover, he observes that the more profound evolution in government has been the movement toward the market-based provision of services, which has created a demand for new competencies in the public sector.


The Challenge Of Administration By Regulation: Preliminary Findings Regarding The U.S. Government's Venture Capital Funds, Jonathan G.S. Koppell Oct 1999

The Challenge Of Administration By Regulation: Preliminary Findings Regarding The U.S. Government's Venture Capital Funds, Jonathan G.S. Koppell

Publications from President Jonathan G.S. Koppell

This article assesses the ability of elected officials to control public policy as implemented by public/private hybrid organizations, specifically, government venture capital funds. The study reveals greater control over OPIC investment funds than Enterprise Funds despite the existence of more traditional administrative tools of control for Enterprise Funds. This finding suggests that the regulatory infrastructure for hybrid organizations is more determinative of control than the existence (or lack) of traditional administrative control tools. Thus the challenge of hybrid government centers on the development of regulation as a substitute for administration.