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The Rise And Spread Of Mandatory Arbitration As A Substitute For The Jury Trial, Jean R. Sternlight
The Rise And Spread Of Mandatory Arbitration As A Substitute For The Jury Trial, Jean R. Sternlight
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THE CIVIL JURY trial is fast disappearing from our legal landscape, and one important reason for its disappearance is the rapid growth of mandatory arbitration. Yet, the imposition of mandatory arbitration eliminates the civil jury, and often this elimination is not made through a knowing, voluntary, or intelligent waiver. As I have argued elsewhere in greater detail, unless federal courts are generally willing to abandon the Seventh Amendment "knowing/voluntary/intelligent" civil jury trial waiver standard, they need to significantly revise their approach to mandatory arbitration clauses. If a given state allows the civil jury trial right to be waived through a …
Should An Arbitration Provision Trump The Class Action? No: Permitting Companies To Skirt Class Actions Through Mandatory Arbitration Would Be Dangerous And Unwise, Jean R. Sternlight
Should An Arbitration Provision Trump The Class Action? No: Permitting Companies To Skirt Class Actions Through Mandatory Arbitration Would Be Dangerous And Unwise, Jean R. Sternlight
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Companies are deliberately using mandatory arbitration to prevent consumers and employces from joining together in class actions. As Carroll Neesemann has explained, eliminating the class action is a "strong incentive" of those companies that impose the requirement of arbitration on consumers and employees. Mr. Neesemann defends this phenomenon, and his article offers companies and their attorneys some tips on how to effectively use arbitration to insulate themselves from the threat of class actions. By contrast, this essay argues that it is dangerous and unwise to permit companies to use mandatory arbitration to exempt themselves from class action suits.
Protecting Franchisees From Abusive Arbitration Clauses, Jean R. Sternlight
Protecting Franchisees From Abusive Arbitration Clauses, Jean R. Sternlight
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This article sets out a number of legal arguments that franchisees can potentially use to defeat arbitration clauses that seek to accomplish ends that would not be permissible in litigation. Drawing from decisions protecting consumers and employees from unfair arbitration clauses, as well as from opinions in the franchise context, this article analyzes arguments that can be based on the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, state statutes, and common law. By way of this analysis, it suggests that some courts are misapplying arbitration precedents and preemption arguments to support decisions that allow franchisors to effectively exempt themselves from legislation and even …
Panacea Or Corporate Tool?: Debunking The Supreme Court's Preference For Binding Arbitration, Jean R. Sternlight
Panacea Or Corporate Tool?: Debunking The Supreme Court's Preference For Binding Arbitration, Jean R. Sternlight
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This article examines the increasing use of contracts of adhesion in which companies require consumers, employees, franchisees and other "little guys" to submit disputes with the company to binding arbitration. The article argues that the Supreme Court's current preference for such agreements is not statutorily well-founded. Specifically, it contends that the Federal Arbitration Act was not intended to make such agreements binding on unknowing consumers or employees. Turning next to policy analysis, the article asserts that the Supreme Court has erred in expressing a preference for binding arbitration in cases where such arbitration was not knowingly and voluntarily accepted by …