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Full-Text Articles in Law

Arbitrator Behaviour In Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study Of Investment Treaty Arbitration, Gus Van Harten Jul 2012

Arbitrator Behaviour In Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study Of Investment Treaty Arbitration, Gus Van Harten

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

The study examines arbitrator behaviour in the unique context of investment treaty arbitration. It employs the method of content analysis to test hypotheses of systemic bias in the resolution of jurisdictional issues in investment treaty law. Unlike earlier studies, the study examines trends in legal interpretation instead of case outcomes and finds statistically significant evidence that arbitrators favour: (1) the position of claimants over respondent states and (2) the position of claimants from major Western capital-exporting states over claimants from other states. There is a range of possible explanations for the results and further inferences are required to connect the …


First Options Of Chicago, Inc. V. Kaplan And The Kompetenz-Kompetenz Principle , Adrianna Dulic Apr 2012

First Options Of Chicago, Inc. V. Kaplan And The Kompetenz-Kompetenz Principle , Adrianna Dulic

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal

In 1995, the United States Supreme Court in First Options of Chicago, Incorporated v. Kaplan considered whether arbitral tribunals or courts should have the primary power to decide if parties agreed to arbitrate the merits of the dispute and whether the court of appeals should accept the district court's findings of fact and law or apply a de novo standard of review. The Court unanimously held that, unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitral tribunal. Furthermore, in such a case, …


Is Three A Crowd? Neutrality, Partiality And Partisanship In The Context Of Tripartite Arbitrations , David J. Mclean, Sean-Patrick Wilson Mar 2012

Is Three A Crowd? Neutrality, Partiality And Partisanship In The Context Of Tripartite Arbitrations , David J. Mclean, Sean-Patrick Wilson

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal

This paper will discuss issues surrounding party-appointed arbitrators on tripartite panels and will attempt to offer practical observations about what parties can expect under the tripartite system.


Outward Bound To Other Cultures: Seven Guidelines For U.S. Dispute Resolution Trainers, Harold Abramson Feb 2012

Outward Bound To Other Cultures: Seven Guidelines For U.S. Dispute Resolution Trainers, Harold Abramson

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal

"Would you like to go to Delhi to train people in negotiations?" the email message inquires. "Are you kidding?" you think to yourself. "Of course, I would get to do in an exotic location what I enjoy doing at home – helping others to resolve conflicts. And I also would meet fascinating people and tour an intriguing city and country with a local host." "YES," you reply after working out the logistical details. Now as you begin to pack your off-the-shelf training materials, you start to wonder how you should adapt your training for this foreign location. You do not …


Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, David S. Schwartz Jan 2012

Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, David S. Schwartz

Indiana Law Journal

Binding, pre-dispute arbitration imposed on the weaker party in an adhesion contract—so-called “mandatory arbitration”—should be recognized for what it truly is: claim-suppressing arbitration. Arguments that such arbitration processes promote access to dispute resolution have been refuted and should not continue to be made without credible empirical support. Drafters of such arbitration clauses are motivated to reduce their liability exposure and, in particular, to eliminate class claims against themselves. Furthermore, claim-suppressing arbitration violates two fundamental principles of due process: it allows one party to the dispute to make the disputing rules; and it gives the adjudicative role to a decision maker …