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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Law
Advocates Say Isds Is Necessary Because Domestic Courts Are ‘Inadequate,’ But Claims And Decisions Don’T Reveal Systemic Failings, Maria Rocha, Martin Dietrich Brauch, Tehtena Mebratu-Tsegaye
Advocates Say Isds Is Necessary Because Domestic Courts Are ‘Inadequate,’ But Claims And Decisions Don’T Reveal Systemic Failings, Maria Rocha, Martin Dietrich Brauch, Tehtena Mebratu-Tsegaye
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications
Proponents of including investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions in treaties, contracts, and even national laws argue that ISDS is necessary because domestic courts are “inadequate.” Without this mechanism, foreign investors would be dependent on domestic courts and administrative mechanisms, which, proponents claim, are often inefficient, slow, biased, corrupt, and lacking in international law expertise, especially in developing countries. As one insight to analyze the “inadequate courts” argument, CCSI has examined treaty-based ISDS cases in which investors complained of domestic court proceedings or decisions, including the specific complaints and the tribunals’ analysis of those claims.
Investor-State Dispute Prevention: A Critical Reflection, Lise Johnson, Lisa E. Sachs, Ella Merrill
Investor-State Dispute Prevention: A Critical Reflection, Lise Johnson, Lisa E. Sachs, Ella Merrill
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications
With the rise of treaty-based investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) which has taken place over the last two decades, a number of governments have adopted varying approaches to avoid those arbitration cases. Countries including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Mexico, Mongolia, and Peru have pursued such initiatives, often with the support of intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations Convention on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) and the World Bank.
In the context of discussions on ISDS reform taking place at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), some states have identified development and implementation of such ISDS-avoidance strategies and tools …
Comments To The Draft Working Group Iii Workplan, Columbia Center On Sustainable Investment, International Institute For Environment And Development, International Institute For Sustainable Development
Comments To The Draft Working Group Iii Workplan, Columbia Center On Sustainable Investment, International Institute For Environment And Development, International Institute For Sustainable Development
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is currently working on how to reform international investment treaties, focusing in particular on those treaties’ provisions enabling investors to sue governments in international arbitration. As an observer organization in this process, CCSI has emphasized that in the context of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) reform, it is important to first consider what it is that investment treaties aim to achieve, and only then to consider what form(s) of dispute settlement will best advance those objectives. This means not only looking at reform of the existing ISDS mechanism, but also alternatives to …
Should The European Union Fix, Leave Or Kill The Energy Charter Treaty?, Martin Dietrich Brauch
Should The European Union Fix, Leave Or Kill The Energy Charter Treaty?, Martin Dietrich Brauch
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications
In the early 1990s, the European Economic Community – the predecessor of the European Union (EU) – spearheaded an initiative to promote international cooperation in the energy sector, particularly with post-Soviet States in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Out of this process the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) was born in 1994. Going much beyond international cooperation, the treaty allows foreign investors in the energy sector to sue their host States in international arbitral tribunals and claim monetary compensation when policy measures and other State action affect their interests.
Fast-forward to 2021. With 135 known cases initiated to date, the ECT’s …