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Dispute Resolution and Arbitration

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Dispute resolution (Law)

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Wto Dispute Settlement: Can We Go Back Again?, Rachel Brewster Jan 2019

Wto Dispute Settlement: Can We Go Back Again?, Rachel Brewster

Faculty Scholarship

The world's twenty-year experiment with a rule-based international trading order is most likely ending. Trade wars are raging again for the first time in two decades as World Trade Organization (WTO) members unilaterally impose and counterimpose sanctions. In Geneva, the WTO Appellate Body, whose existence is essential to the functioning of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), is on a trajectory to shut down in December 2020. For all the fireworks, however, many commentators retain an optimism that the recent events will be a passing phase and that the world will return to a more law-oriented trading system after the …


Us-Cool Retaliation: The Wto’S Article 22.6 Arbitration, Chad P. Bown, Rachel Brewster Jan 2017

Us-Cool Retaliation: The Wto’S Article 22.6 Arbitration, Chad P. Bown, Rachel Brewster

Faculty Scholarship

This paper examines the World Trade Organization’s Article 22.6 arbitration report on the dispute over the United States’ country of origin labeling (US–COOL) regulation for meat products. At prior phases of the legal process, a WTO Panel and the Appellate Body had sided with Canada and Mexico by finding that the US regulation had negatively affected their exports of livestock – cattle and hogs – to the US market. The arbitrators authorized Canada and Mexico to retaliate by over $1 billion against US exports – the second largest authorized retaliation on record and only the twelfth WTO dispute to reach …


Trust And The Srba Mediation, Francis E. Mcgovern Jan 2016

Trust And The Srba Mediation, Francis E. Mcgovern

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Differentiating Among International Investment Disputes, Julie A. Maupin Jan 2014

Differentiating Among International Investment Disputes, Julie A. Maupin

Faculty Scholarship

Can investor-state arbitration tribunals, which exercise jurisdiction over limited claims involving discrete parties, render awards that deliver individualized justice while also promoting systemic fairness, predictability and coherence? The answer, I argue, is a qualified yes – provided that the methods employed are tailored to the particular characteristics of each dispute. Using three well-known investment arbitrations as case studies, I illustrate that investor-state disputes vary widely in terms of their socio-legal, territorial, and political impacts. Significant variances along these three dimensions call for a differentiated approach to investor-state dispute resolution. I outline what such an approach might look like and analyze …


Pricing Compliance: When Formal Remedies Displace Reputational Sanctions, Rachel Brewster Jan 2013

Pricing Compliance: When Formal Remedies Displace Reputational Sanctions, Rachel Brewster

Faculty Scholarship

The conventional wisdom in international law is that dispute resolution institutions sharpen the reputational costs to states. This article challenges this understanding by examining how the inclusion of dispute resolution tribunals and remedy regimes can alter reputational analysis by shifting the audience¹s understanding of how mandatory a treaty's substantive obligations are. Drawing on the distinction between prices and sanctions, this article contests the assumption that the introduction of a remedy regime in international agreements will regularly increase compliance with the treaty¹s substantive terms. Instead, some remedy regimes may 'price' deviations from the treaty¹s terms and thereby facilitate breaches of the …


"Brother, Can You Spare A Dime?" Technology Can Reduce Dispute Resolution Costs When Times Are Tough And Improve Outcomes, David Allen Larson Jan 2011

"Brother, Can You Spare A Dime?" Technology Can Reduce Dispute Resolution Costs When Times Are Tough And Improve Outcomes, David Allen Larson

Faculty Scholarship

Cost reduction is one of the desirable results frequently attributed to Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes. Although it is reasonable to assume that businesses always are interested in saving money, this goal takes on added importance when the economy is struggling. The cost savings inherent in ADR, which already are significant, can be increased substantially through the strategic adoption of technology. Although I generally do not urge caution when it comes to expanding the ways in which we use technology, we nonetheless must recognize not only technology’s potential benefits but also its possible pitfalls. It is relatively easy to identify …


The Surprising Benefits To Developing Countries Of Linking International Trade And Intellectual Property, Rachel Brewster Jan 2011

The Surprising Benefits To Developing Countries Of Linking International Trade And Intellectual Property, Rachel Brewster

Faculty Scholarship

The World Trade Organization's Trade Related Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement is controversial, requiring WTO members to establish a host of domestic institutions to support intellectual property rights, including substantive laws creating rights and a host of enforcement procedures. Trade scholars and development advocates frequently criticize the agreement as economically harmful to developing countries. This Article does not argue that the TRIPS Agreement is beneficial for developing states, but highlights how the agreement has produced some surprising benefits over the last decade and a half. First, the TRIPS Agreement's requirement that developing states make the domestic enforcement of intellectual property rules …


The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, And Trade Law Enforcement, Rachel Brewster Jan 2011

The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, And Trade Law Enforcement, Rachel Brewster

Faculty Scholarship

One of the major innovations of the World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) is the regulation of sanctions in response to violations of trade law. The DSU requires governments to receive multilateral approval before suspending trade concessions and limits the extent of retaliation to prospective damages. In addition, the DSU permits governments to impose only conditional sanctions: sanctions for violations that continue after the dispute resolution process is complete. This enforcement regime creates a remedy gap: governments cannot respond, even to obvious breaches, until the end of the dispute resolution process (and then only to the extent of …


Artificial Intelligence: Robots, Avatars And The Demise Of The Human Mediator, David Allen Larson Jan 2010

Artificial Intelligence: Robots, Avatars And The Demise Of The Human Mediator, David Allen Larson

Faculty Scholarship

As technology has advanced, many have wondered whether (or simply when) artificial intelligent devices will replace the humans who perform complex, interactive, interpersonal tasks such as dispute resolution. Has science now progressed to the point that artificial intelligence devices can replace human mediators, arbitrators, dispute resolvers and problem solvers? Can humanoid robots, attractive avatars and other relational agents create the requisite level of trust and elicit the truthful, perhaps intimate or painful, disclosures often necessary to resolve a dispute or solve a problem? This article will explore these questions. Regardless of whether the reader is convinced that the demise of …


Why The Chinese Public Prefer Administrative Petitioning Over Litigation, Taisu Zhang Jan 2009

Why The Chinese Public Prefer Administrative Petitioning Over Litigation, Taisu Zhang

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, the Chinese public, when facing disputes with government officials, have preferred a non-legal means of resolution, the Xinfang system, over litigation. Some scholars explain this by claiming that administrative litigation is less effective than Xinfang petitioning. Others argue that the Chinese have historically eschewed litigation and continue to do so habitually. This paper proposes a new explanation: Chinese have traditionally litigated administrative disputes, but only when legal procedure is not too adversarial and allows for the possibility of reconciliation through court-directed settlement. Since this possibility does not formally exist in modern Chinese administrative litigation, people tend to …