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Why Does The Complainant Always Win At The Wto?: A Reputation-Based Theory Of Litigation At The World Trade Organization, Matthew C. Turk
Why Does The Complainant Always Win At The Wto?: A Reputation-Based Theory Of Litigation At The World Trade Organization, Matthew C. Turk
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business
World Trade Organization (WTO) litigation presents an empirical puzzle: complaining parties "win" close to 90 percent of cases, while standard theories of litigation predict a strong tendency towards a 50 percent plaintiff win-rate. This Article explains the high win-rate by examining the reputational costs and benefits of filing a case. The WTO's lack of centralized enforcement means that the consequence of a judgment is merely to disseminate information that alters a party's reputation for compliance with its trade obligations. Such a "reputational sanction" applies to both losing respondents and complainants. The result is that only cases with a very high …
The Dignity, Rights, And Responsibilities Of The Jury: On The Structure Of Normative Argument, Robert P. Burns
The Dignity, Rights, And Responsibilities Of The Jury: On The Structure Of Normative Argument, Robert P. Burns
Faculty Working Papers
Many theorists follow an inevitably circular method in evaluating legal institutions and practices. "Considered judgments of justice" embedded in practices and institutions in which we have a high level of confidence can serve as partial evidence for the principles with which they are consistent, principles that can then have broader implications. Conversely, principles that we have good reason to embrace can serve as partial justification for institutions and practices with which they are consistent. This is the heart of Rawls' notion of "reflective equilibrium," where we "work at both ends" to justify institutions, practices, and principles. This method is applicable …