Law Commons^™

Probable Cause And Common Sense: A Reply To The Critics Of Illinois V. Gates, Joseph D. Grano

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Part I of this article reviews Gates's actual holding. Although one can view much of the Court's more interesting discussion of the two-pronged test as dicta, the majority and dissenters clearly did not regard it as such. The majority and dissenters disagreed, however, not only over the appropriate hearsay test but, more fundamentally, over the nature of probable cause itself. I will argue that one must resolve this more basic disagreement before properly addressing the hearsay issue.

Part II examines probable cause from an historical perspective. In this part, I attempt to demonstrate that both the English common law …

The Fourth Amendment And The Control Of Police Discretion, William J. Mertens

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The fourth amendment protects the security of people's "persons, houses, papers, and effects" in two distinct (if overlapping) ways. First, it requires a sufficiently weighty public interest before the government's agents are allowed to search or seize. Thus, for example, probable cause is required for arrest. Whatever uncertainty there may be in the phrase "probable cause" (and, for that matter, however indefinite the idea of "arrest" may have become), in this context, at least, the probable cause standard requires the demonstration of objective facts that point with some probability to the guilt for some particular offense of the person arrested. …

Subsequent Use Of Electronic Surveillance Interceptions And The Plain View Doctrine: Fourth Amendment Limitations On The Omnibus Crime Control Act, Raymond R. Kepner

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Despite the critical examination to which many sections of Title III have been subjected, section 2517(5) has received little serious scrutiny from either the courts or the commentators. This note will analyze the constitutionality of the section in terms of the standards which the Supreme Court has articulated, both with respect to the law of search and seizure generally and with respect to electronic surveillance. This examination will reveal that section 2517(5) cannot be sustained under the existing contours of fourth amendment interpretation.