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Full-Text Articles in Law

School Children And Parolees: Not So Special Anymore, Edwin Butterfoss Jan 2011

School Children And Parolees: Not So Special Anymore, Edwin Butterfoss

Faculty Scholarship

The Fourth Amendment special needs exception may be one of the Court’s most puzzling doctrines. Since its origin, the Court has struggled to define its limits and its place in the Court’s suspicionless search and seizure jurisprudence. At times the Court has suggested that the exception is the only route to upholding a search or seizure in the absence of individualized suspicion, while at other times it has stated that it is just one of a limited number of exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion. Historically, while the application of the special needs exception has been unpredictable, one thing …


An Escape Route From The Medellin Maze, Anthony S. Winer Jan 2010

An Escape Route From The Medellin Maze, Anthony S. Winer

Faculty Scholarship

Many in the United States who follow international law have tracked the course of the Supreme Court's 2008 Medellin case' especially closely, both before and after the Court's issuance of the decision. The case concerned the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (the "Vienna Convention, "Convention" or "VCCR"), which imposes certain obligations on the authorities of a State Party when they imprison a national of another State Party. Among these duties is the obligation to inform the foreign prisoner that the Convention affords the prisoner the right to communicate, while in prison, with consular officials from the prisoner's home country. Authorities …


Without A Doubt, A Sharp And Radical Departure: The Minnesota Supreme Court’S Decision To Change Plain Error Review Of Unobjected-To Prosecutorial Error In State V. Ramsey, James Morrow, Joshua R. Larson Jan 2008

Without A Doubt, A Sharp And Radical Departure: The Minnesota Supreme Court’S Decision To Change Plain Error Review Of Unobjected-To Prosecutorial Error In State V. Ramsey, James Morrow, Joshua R. Larson

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Minnesota's Distortion Of Rule 609, Ted Sampsell-Jones Jan 2008

Minnesota's Distortion Of Rule 609, Ted Sampsell-Jones

Faculty Scholarship


Rule of Evidence 609, which governs the admission of prior convictions of a witness for purposes of impeachment, occupies an important place in the day to day operation of American criminal trials. The rule is a compromise that reflects these competing values. It admits some prior convictions but not all. Crimen falsi offenses such as perjury and fraud are automatically admissible under 609(a)(2). All other felonies are analyzed under the balancing test of 609(a)(1), which allows the admission of a defendant-witness's crimes if the “probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused.” The rule seeks …


Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin's New Governance Experiment, Kate Kruse Jan 2006

Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin's New Governance Experiment, Kate Kruse

Faculty Scholarship

The DNA exoneration cases of the past two decades have provided a window into what hasn't been working in the criminal justice system and an agenda for criminal justice reform. The challenge currently facing the innocence reform community is to translate this agenda into concrete reforms that institute and sustain best practices for the investigation and prosecution of crimes, while allowing flexibility for the understanding of best practices to continue to evolve. In 2005, Wisconsin underwent a breathtaking course of legal reform in two of the problem areas that have plagued wrongful convictions: mistaken eyewitness identification and false confession. The …


Solving The Pretext Puzzle: The Importance Of Ulterior Motives And Fabrications In The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment Pretext Doctrine, Edwin J. Butterfoss Jan 1990

Solving The Pretext Puzzle: The Importance Of Ulterior Motives And Fabrications In The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment Pretext Doctrine, Edwin J. Butterfoss

Faculty Scholarship

This Article first analyzes the debate between Professors John M. Burkoff and James B. Haddad over the current state of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the pretext issue. It shows that the Supreme Court's definition of pretext is broader than the definition of pretext used by these commentators. The Supreme Court's definition includes both "legal" and fabricated pretexts. In a "legal" pretext, the government offers a justification that is not the true reason for the police activity, but that, if the motivation of the officer is not considered, legally justifies the activity. In a fabricated pretext, the government offers a justification …


Wisconsin Sentence Modification: A View From The Trial Court, Kate Kruse, Kim E. Patterson Jan 1989

Wisconsin Sentence Modification: A View From The Trial Court, Kate Kruse, Kim E. Patterson

Faculty Scholarship

In Wisconsin, trial courts have discretion to modify a defendant's criminal sentence if the defendant introduces a "new factor." Published Wisconsin case law gives little guidance on what constitutes a new factor. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has declined to find a new factor present in every case it has published since defining "new factor" in 1978. Because of ambiguous and conflicting rulings, the standards for both prongs of the new factor definition remain unclear. This Comment attempts to shed light on the new factor requirement for sentence modification by examining Wisconsin trial court decisions on a limited sample of sentence …


Bright Line Seizures: The Need For Clarity In Determining When Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, Edwin J. Butterfoss Jan 1988

Bright Line Seizures: The Need For Clarity In Determining When Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, Edwin J. Butterfoss

Faculty Scholarship

This Article proposes that the Mendenhall-Royer standard, as presently interpreted, should be discarded because it is unworkable and fails to strike the appropriate balance between the liberty interests of citizens and the interest of the state in combatting crime. The test is unworkable because the outcomes of cases turn on subtle factual distinctions unrelated to an individual's actual freedom to end an encounter with a police officer, making it difficult for police officers to apply the standard in the field and adjust their conduct accordingly. Moreover, the standard provides insufficient protection for an individual's rights by failing to consider the …