Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
- Publication
- File Type
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Innocence Effect, Oren Gazal-Ayal, Avishalom Tor
The Innocence Effect, Oren Gazal-Ayal, Avishalom Tor
Oren Gazal-Ayal
Nearly all felony convictions—about 95%—follow guilty pleas, suggesting plea offers are very attractive compared to trials. Many scholars, in fact, argue plea bargains are too attractive and should be curtailed because they facilitate the wrongful conviction of innocents. Others contend plea offers only benefit innocent defendants, providing an alternative to the risk of a much harsher sentence at trial they may wish to avoid. Both detractors and supporters thus believe plea bargains often lead innocents to plead guilty. The two camps in the debate, moreover, also share the view that defendants’ culpability matters little for the rate of plea bargaining, …
Bargained Justice: Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem And The Brady Safety-Valve, Lucian Dervan
Bargained Justice: Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem And The Brady Safety-Valve, Lucian Dervan
Lucian E Dervan
If any number of attorneys were asked in 2004 whether Lea Fastow’s plea bargain in the Enron case was constitutional, the majority would respond with a simple word – Brady. Yet while the 1970 Supreme Court decision Brady v. United States authorized plea bargaining as a form of American justice, the case also contained a vital caveat that has been largely overlooked by scholars, practitioners, and courts for almost forty years. Brady contains a safety-valve that caps the amount of pressure that may be asserted against defendants by prohibiting prosecutors from offering incentives in return for guilty pleas that are …