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Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Law
Why It's Time For Pervasive Surveillance...Of The Police, Russell Dean Covey
Why It's Time For Pervasive Surveillance...Of The Police, Russell Dean Covey
Russell D. Covey
No abstract provided.
Signaling And Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem, Russell D. Covey
Signaling And Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem, Russell D. Covey
Russell D. Covey
The dominant theoretical model ofplea bargainingp redicts that, under conditions of full information and rational choice, criminal cases should uniformly be settled through plea bargaining. That prediction holds for innocent and guilty defendants alike. Because it is perfectly rational for innocent defendants to plead guilty, plea bargaining might be said to have an "innocence problem. " Plea bargaining's innocence problem is, at bottom, the result of a signaling defect. Innocent defendants lacking verifiable innocence claims are pooled together with guilty defendants who falsely proclaim innocence. As a result, both groups of defendants are treated similarly at trial and in plea …
Rules, Standards, Sentencing, And The Nature Of Law, Russell D. Covey
Rules, Standards, Sentencing, And The Nature Of Law, Russell D. Covey
Russell D. Covey
Sentencing law and practice in the United States can be characterized as an argument about rules and standards. Whereas in the decades prior to the 1980s when sentencing was largely a discretionary activity governed only by broad sentencing standards, a sentencing reform movement in the 1980s transformed sentencing practice through the advent of sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum provisions. As a result, sentencing became far less standard-like and far more rule-like. Although reform proponents believed that this "rulification" of sentencing would reduce unwarranted sentencing disparities and enhance justice, it is far from clear that these goals were achieved. Indeed, the …
Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea-Bargaining With Plea-Based Ceilings, Russell D. Covey
Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea-Bargaining With Plea-Based Ceilings, Russell D. Covey
Russell D. Covey
The ubiquity of plea bargaining creates real concern that innocent defendants are occasionally, or perhaps even routinely, pleading guilty to avoid coercive trial sentences. Pleading guilty is a rational choice for defendants as long as prosecutors offer plea discounts so substantial that trial is not a rational strategy regardless of guilt or innocence. The long-recognized solution to this problem is to enforce limits on the size of the plea/trial sentencing differential. As a practical matter, however, discount limits are unenforceable if prosecutors retain ultimate discretion over charge selection and declination. Because the doctrine of prosecutorial charging discretion is immune to …
Abolishing Jailhouse Snitch Testimony, Russell D. Covey
Abolishing Jailhouse Snitch Testimony, Russell D. Covey
Russell D. Covey
Jailhouse snitch testimony is inherently unreliable. Snitches have powerful incentives to invent incriminating lies about other inmates in often well-founded hopes that such testimony will provide them with material benefits, including in many cases substantial reduction of criminal charges against them or of the time they are required to serve. At the same time, false snitch testimony is difficult, if not altogether impossible, for criminal defendants to impeach. Because such testimony usually pits the word of two individuals against one another, both of whose credibility is suspect, jurors have little ability to accurately or effectively assess or weigh the evidence. …
Longitudinal Guilt: Repeat Offenders, Plea Bargaining, And The Variable Standard Of Proof, Russell D. Covey
Longitudinal Guilt: Repeat Offenders, Plea Bargaining, And The Variable Standard Of Proof, Russell D. Covey
Russell D. Covey
This Article introduces a new concept-“longitudinal guilt”-which invites readers to reconsider basic presuppositions about the way our criminal justice system determines guilt in criminal cases. In short, the idea is that a variety of features of criminal procedure, most importantly, plea bargaining, conspire to change the primary “truthfinding mission” of criminal law from one of adjudicating individual historical cases to one of identifying dangerous “offenders.” This change of mission is visible in the lower proof standards we apply to repeat criminal offenders. The first section of this Article explains how plea bargaining and graduated sentencing systems based on criminal history …
Abolishing Jailhouse Snitch Testimony, Russell D. Covey
Abolishing Jailhouse Snitch Testimony, Russell D. Covey
Russell D. Covey
Jailhouse snitch testimony is inherently unreliable. Snitches have powerful incentives to invent incriminating lies about other inmates in often well-founded hopes that such testimony will provide them with material benefits, including in many cases substantial reduction of criminal charges against them or of the time they are required to serve. At the same time, false snitch testimony is difficult, if not altogether impossible, for criminal defendants to impeach. Because such testimony usually pits the word of two individuals against one another, both of whose credibility is suspect, jurors have little ability to accurately or effectively assess or weigh the evidence. …
Signaling And Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem, Russell D. Covey
Signaling And Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem, Russell D. Covey
Russell D. Covey
The dominant theoretical model ofplea bargainingp redicts that, under conditions of full information and rational choice, criminal cases should uniformly be settled through plea bargaining. That prediction holds for innocent and guilty defendants alike. Because it is perfectly rational for innocent defendants to plead guilty, plea bargaining might be said to have an "innocence problem. " Plea bargaining's innocence problem is, at bottom, the result of a signaling defect. Innocent defendants lacking verifiable innocence claims are pooled together with guilty defendants who falsely proclaim innocence. As a result, both groups of defendants are treated similarly at trial and in plea …
Longitudinal Guilt: Repeat Offenders, Plea Bargaining, And The Variable Standard Of Proof, Russell D. Covey
Longitudinal Guilt: Repeat Offenders, Plea Bargaining, And The Variable Standard Of Proof, Russell D. Covey
Russell D. Covey
This Article introduces a new concept-“longitudinal guilt”-which invites readers to reconsider basic presuppositions about the way our criminal justice system determines guilt in criminal cases. In short, the idea is that a variety of features of criminal procedure, most importantly, plea bargaining, conspire to change the primary “truthfinding mission” of criminal law from one of adjudicating individual historical cases to one of identifying dangerous “offenders.” This change of mission is visible in the lower proof standards we apply to repeat criminal offenders. The first section of this Article explains how plea bargaining and graduated sentencing systems based on criminal history …