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Criminal Procedure

Columbia Law School

Harvard Law Review

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Bail At The Founding, Kellen R. Funk, Sandra G. Mayson Jan 2024

Bail At The Founding, Kellen R. Funk, Sandra G. Mayson

Faculty Scholarship

How did criminal bail work in the Founding era? This question has become pressing as bail, and bail reform, have attracted increasing attention, in part because history is thought to bear on the meaning of bail-related constitutional provisions. To date, however, there has been no thorough account of bail at the Founding. This Article begins to correct the deficit in our collective memory by describing bail law and practice in the Founding era, from approximately 1790 to 1810. In order to give a full account, we surveyed a wide range of materials, including Founding-era statutes, case law, legal treatises, and …


Rethinking Retroactivity, Robert J. Jackson Jr. Jan 2005

Rethinking Retroactivity, Robert J. Jackson Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Under the stringent test set forth in Teague v. Lane,' defendants convicted of criminal offenses are generally unable to collaterally attack their convictions by invoking constitutional rules of criminal procedure announced after their convictions become final.2 The purported exception to this general principle is said to require that a new constitutional rule be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'3 for it to be applied to criminal cases decided before its pronouncement. Once a rule of criminal procedure is characterized as "new,"4 Teague prohibits the rule's invocation in habeas proceedings unless the rule both "assure[s] that no man has been …


First Amendment "Due Process", Henry Paul Monaghan Jan 1970

First Amendment "Due Process", Henry Paul Monaghan

Faculty Scholarship

A number of recent Supreme Court opinions, primarily in the obscenity area, have fastened strict procedural requirements on governmental action aimed at controlling the exercise of first amendment rights. Professor Monaghan believes that there are two basic principles that can be distilled from these cases: that a judicial body, following an adversary hearing, must decide on the protected character of the speech, and that the judicial determination must either precede or immediately follow any governmental action which restricts speech. The author argues that these two broad principles should limit any governmental activity which affects freedom of speech, no matter how …