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Full-Text Articles in Law
Two Standards Of Competency Are Better Than One: Why Some Defendants Who Are Not Competent To Stand Trial Should Be Permitted To Plead Guilty, Jason R. Marshall
Two Standards Of Competency Are Better Than One: Why Some Defendants Who Are Not Competent To Stand Trial Should Be Permitted To Plead Guilty, Jason R. Marshall
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This Note argues that the present uniform standard of competency, competence to stand trial, be abolished in favor of two standards: competence to stand trial and competence to plea bargain. Part I traces the history of the competency standard by exploring its common law origins, the Supreme Court rulings that frame the debate, an academic reformulation of the competency inquiry, and the interests protected by requiring that defendants be competent to proceed through the criminal process. Part II contrasts the cognitive abilities, capacity to communicate with counsel, and courtroom behavior of defendants standing trial with those qualities required of defendants …
Time Travel, Hovercrafts, And The Fourth Amendment: If James Madison Could Have Seen The Future, George C. Thomas
Time Travel, Hovercrafts, And The Fourth Amendment: If James Madison Could Have Seen The Future, George C. Thomas
ExpressO
Recent historical work has raised the intriguing possibility that the Framers meant to accomplish only one goal in the Fourth Amendment: to forbid general warrants. On this historical account, the first clause stating a right of the people to be "free from unreasonable searches and seizures" is merely declaratory of the principle that led the Framers to ban general warrants. Rephrased to be true to this history, the Fourth Amendment would say: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against general warrants shall not be violated, and no general warrants shall issue." …
The Uses Of History In Crawford V. Washington, Frank Herrmann
The Uses Of History In Crawford V. Washington, Frank Herrmann
Frank R. Herrmann, S.J.
To a striking degree, both the majority and concurring opinions in Crawford v. Washington are replete with references to Anglo-American historical materials, used to support differing conclusions about the application of the Confrontation Clause to testimonial hearsay. This essay sets out Justice Scalia's and Chief Justice Rehnquist's historical arguments and then employs the standards of legal historians to evaluate whether the two opinions use history in a valid manner. The essay concludes that the "history" in Crawford is not that of an historian, but is a "usable past," as conceived by Cass Sunstein and Stephen Griffin.