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Plain Meaning, Practical Reason, And Cuplability: Toward A Theory Of Jury Interpretation Of Criminal Statutes, Darryl K. Brown
Plain Meaning, Practical Reason, And Cuplability: Toward A Theory Of Jury Interpretation Of Criminal Statutes, Darryl K. Brown
Michigan Law Review
In one of the few existing recordings of American juries deliberating in an actual criminal case, Wisconsin v. Reed, we observe jurors struggling with how they should apply a statute in a case in which the facts are not in real dispute. The defendant is charged with felon in possession of a gun, and all agree that he has a felony record and owned a pistol until he turned it over to the police upon their request. The statute contains three elements. The defendant must (a) have a felony conviction, (b) have possessed a gun, and (c) have known that …
Reasonable Certainty And Reasonable Doubt, Henry L. Chambers, Jr.
Reasonable Certainty And Reasonable Doubt, Henry L. Chambers, Jr.
Law Faculty Publications
Ultimately, this article is about how well different definitions of reasonable doubt fit society's goals for the criminal justice system. To be clear, this article is not about which definition is best. That question is far broader than the one I seek to explore. Determining what definition of reasonable doubt is best for the system is a question for another time. Rather, this article describes a few different ways that reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence can be interpreted and considers the implications of applying those differing interpretations. Part II of this article examines how the criminal justice system …
Race, Angst And Capital Punishment: The Burger Court's Existential Struggle, Katherine R. Kruse
Race, Angst And Capital Punishment: The Burger Court's Existential Struggle, Katherine R. Kruse
Scholarly Works
This article chronicles the Burger Court's inability to fashion a suitable remedy for racism in the discretionary system of capital sentencing. The article discusses the Court's initial response, “remedial paralysis,” which is evident, not only in McGautha v. California, where the Court refused to find that the Due Process Clause was violated by standardless death sentencing, but also in Furman v. Georgia, where the Court decided to abolish the death penalty. The article further explores the Court's reinstatement of the death penalty, and two of the Court's forays into “bad faith” denial that sustained the death penalty, particularly the Court's …
Thoughts From Across The Water On Hearsay And Confrontation, Richard D. Friedman
Thoughts From Across The Water On Hearsay And Confrontation, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
This article draws on the history of the hearsay rule, and on recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, to argue that the right to confrontation should be recognised as a basic principle of the law of evidence, and that aspects of the Law Commission's proposals for reform of the hearsay rule, and of the Home Office's proposals for restrictions on the right of cross-examination, are therefore unsatisfactory.