Law Commons^™

Another Collateral Consequence: Kicking The Victim When She’S Down, Lauren N. Hancock

Washington and Lee Law Review

Every state has a victim compensation fund that provides financial relief to victims of crime who have no other way to pay for medical expenses, funeral costs, crime scene cleanup, or other costs associated with the crime. States impose their own eligibility requirements to determine which victims can receive funding. Six states prohibit victims with certain criminal histories from obtaining compensation. This means that innocent victims of crime are left with nowhere to turn because of something that they already “paid” for. This leaves victims, who are likely already in a financially precarious situation due to their felon status, with …

Limited Privacy In “Pings:” Why Law Enforcement’S Use Of Cell-Site Simulators Does Not Categorically Violate The Fourth Amendment, Lara M. Mcmahon

Washington and Lee Law Review

This Note proposes four factors courts should consider when asked to determine whether law enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator constituted a Fourth Amendment search. The first asks courts to consider whether the cell-site simulator surveillance infringed on a constitutionally protected area, such as the home. The second asks courts to consider the duration of the cell-site simulator surveillance. The third asks courts to consider whether the cell-site simulator surveillance was conducted actively or passively. The fourth asks courts to focus on the nature and depth of the information obtained as a result of the cell-site simulator surveillance. If, after …

Kids, Not Commodities: Proposing A More Protective Interpretation Of The Child Sex Trafficking Statute For Victims And Defendants, Kimberly Blasey

Washington and Lee Law Review

This Note addresses how courts should interpret the “reasonable opportunity to observe” standard when assessing evidence. In other words, what quantum of evidence is, and should be, sufficient to prove a defendant had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” a sex trafficking victim? Would a singular brief encounter with an older-appearing prostitute satisfy the standard? If so, would the mere fact that the “prostitute” was actually a minor be the only evidence needed to obtain a conviction? Or would the defendant’s intention and attempt to order services from an adult prostitute shed light on the reasonableness of his observation opportunity? Moreover, …

Reinvesting In Rico With Cryptocurrencies: Using Cryptocurrency Networks To Prove Rico’S Enterprise Requirement, Andrew Robert Klimek

Washington and Lee Law Review

This Note received the 2019 Roy L. Steinheimer Law Review Award.

This Note argues that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) may be suited to cryptocurrency prosecutions. RICO subsection 1962(a) addresses the infiltration of an enterprise by investing proceeds from racketeering activities and this Note contends that a cryptocurrency network could serve as the “enterprise” required by the statute. Instead of having to investigate and prove the relationships in an underlying criminal enterprise, proponents of a RICO case against crypto-criminals could rely on well-documented and publicly available information about the cryptocurrency network to prove the enterprise and the …

Secret Conviction Programs, Meghan J. Ryan

Washington and Lee Law Review

Judges and juries across the country are convicting criminal defendants based on secret evidence. Although defendants have sought access to the details of this evidence—the results of computer programs and their underlying algorithms and source codes—judges have generally denied their requests. Instead, judges have prioritized the business interests of the for-profit companies that developed these “conviction programs” and which could lose market share if the secret algorithms and source codes on which the programs are based were exposed. This decision has jeopardized criminal defendants’ constitutional rights.

Collateral Consequences Of Pretrial Diversion Programs Under The Heck Doctrine, Bonnie Gill

Washington and Lee Law Review

Following the Introduction, Part II of this Note gives an overview of federal and state pretrial diversion programs. Part III explores the statutory and doctrinal background of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including its interaction with another civil rights statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the federal habeas statute. Both statutes are essential to understanding the Heck v. Humphrey doctrine’s purpose and application to pretrial diversion participants. Part III also explores the development and interpretation of the Heck doctrine in four Supreme Court cases. Part IV discusses the circuit split as it currently stands. Part V presents three proposals for resolving the …

Reasonable Doubt And Relativity, Michael D. Cicchini

Washington and Lee Law Review

In theory, the Constitution protects us against criminal conviction unless the state can prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In reality, this lofty standard is only as strong as the words used to explain it to the jury.

Unfortunately, attempts to explain reasonable doubt often create confusion, and sometimes even diminish the burden of proof. Many courts therefore believe that the better practice is not to attempt a definition. However, empirical studies demonstrate that reasonable doubt is not self-defining, i.e., when it is not explained to the jury, it offers defendants no greater protection against conviction than the two lower, …