Law Commons^™

Taking Aim At Pointing Guns? Start With Citizen’S Arrest, Not Stand Your Ground: A Reply To Joseph Blocher, Samuel W. Buell, Jacob D. Charles, And Darrell A.H. Miller, Pointing Guns, 99 Texas L. Rev. 1173 (2021), Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

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Defending Honor And Beyond: Reconsidering The Relationship Between Seemingly Futile Defense And Permissible Harming, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

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In Helen Frowe's book, Defensive Killing, she argues that some cases of seemingly futile self-defense are actually instances of justifiable defense of the victim's honor. This paper explores Frowe's claim, first by isolating the central cases and then by examining her rejection of punitive reasons. From there, the paper examines Frowe's understanding of "defense of honor," ultimately suggesting that Frowe's conception is best construed as action that has expressive, but not defensive, value. From there, I turn to two more general puzzles. First, what if the defender mistakenly believes that she can successfully defend and acts for that reason, …

Self-Defense: Tell Me Moore, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

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Although Michael Moore has theorized much of the criminal law, he has left self-defense virtually untouched. This festschrift chapter sets forth the current debates within self-defense theory. It then pieces together Moore’s views about these puzzles, arguing that Moore adopts a distributive view of self-defense whereby an innocent victim may redistribute harm to its culpable or innocent cause. The chapter then questions some of Moore’s claims, including how Moore grounds the self-defensive right against innocent aggressors and threats, whether self-defense is best viewed as a mechanism for harm distribution, and whether Moore needs something like the forfeiture concept that he …

The American Criminal Code: General Defenses, Paul H. Robinson, Matthew Kussmaul, Camber Stoddard, Ilya Rudyak, Andreas Kuersten

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There are fifty-two bodies of criminal law in the United States. Each stakes out often diverse positions on a range of issues. This article defines the “American rule” for each of the issues relating to general defenses, a first contribution towards creating an “American Criminal Code.”

The article is the result of a several-year research project examining every issue relating to justification, excuse, and non-exculpatory defenses. It determines the majority American position among the fifty-two jurisdictions, and formulates statutory language for each defense that reflects that majority rule. The article also compares and contrasts the majority position to significant minority …

Culpable Aggression: The Basis For Moral Liability To Defensive Killing, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

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The use of the term, "self-defense, " covers a wide array of defensive behaviors, and different actions that repel attacks may be permissible for different reasons. One important justificatory feature of some defensive behaviors is that the aggressor has rendered himself liable to defensive force by his own conduct. That is, when a culpable aggressor points a gun at a defender, and says, "I am going to kill you," the aggressor's behavior forfeits the aggressor's right against the defender's infliction of harm that is intended to repel the aggressor's attack. Because the right is forfeited, numbers do not count (the …

Self-Defense, Permissions, And The Means Principle: A Reply To Quong, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

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In “Killing in Self-Defense” (119 Ethics 507 (2009)), Jonathan Quong claims that one may kill innocent aggressors and threats in self-defense, but he denies that it follows from his position that innocent bystanders may also be killed when one acts defensively. Quong argues that defenders have an agent-relative permission to favor their own lives over others’. However, there are moral constraints, including that one may not “use someone as a mere means,” and Quong claims that it is this constraint that prohibits the killing of innocent bystanders. To reach this conclusion, Quong construes the “means principle” quite broadly to include …

Beyond Crime And Commitment: Justifying Liberty Deprivations Of The Dangerous And Responsible, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

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The traditional approaches to dangerous persons have been crime and commitment. The criminal law punishes responsible actors, and the civil law confines the mentally ill. These approaches leave a gap: The state cannot substantially restrict the liberty of responsible actors until they have committed a crime. In response to this gap, the criminal law’s boundaries have expanded to include preparatory offenses and early inchoate conduct that are deserving of only minimal, if any, punishment in attempt to incarcerate the dangerous. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court’s effort to articulate a test of mental disease warranting involuntary confinement of sexual predators has failed …

A Right To Bear Firearms But Not To Use Them? Defensive Force Rules And The Increasing Effectiveness Of Non-Lethal Weapons, Paul H. Robinson

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Under existing American law, advances in non-lethal weapons increasingly make the use of firearms for defense unlawful and the Second Amendment of little practical significance. As the effectiveness and availability of less lethal weapons increase, the choice of a lethal firearm for protection is a choice to use more force than is necessary, in violation of existing self-defense law. At the same time, a shift to non-lethal weapons increases the frequency of situations in which a person’s use of force is authorized because defenders with non-lethal weapons are freed from the special proportionality requirements that limit the use of deadly …

Self-Defense And The State, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

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This article is a contribution to a symposium honoring Sandy Kadish. This article seeks to explore whether and to what extent our understanding of self-defense depends upon a citizen's relationship with the state. Part II begins by setting forth Professor Kadish's claim that self-defense is "a right to resist aggression" that is held by a citizen against the state. After contending that such an account is insufficient to justify self-defense, the remainder of the article seeks to explore the relationship between the state and self-defense. Part III argues that self-defense is a pre-political moral right, as opposed to a political …

Defending Imminence: From Battered Women To Iraq, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

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The war against Iraq and nonconfrontational killings by battered women are two recent examples of a more general theoretical problem. The underlying question is when may a defender act in self-defense. While some nineteenth century common law cases vested the rights in the defender, arguing that it was unfair to force her to live in fear, contemporary domestic and international law cast the balance decidedly on the side of the aggressor, by forcing the defender to wait until the aggressor's attack is imminent. The Bush Administration and the battered woman simply ask whether the pendulum swung too far in the …