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Criminal Law

University at Buffalo School of Law

Journal Articles

Consent

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Solving The Riddle Of Rape By Deception, Luis E. Chiesa Jan 2017

Solving The Riddle Of Rape By Deception, Luis E. Chiesa

Journal Articles

Is sex obtained by lies an act of lawful seduction or criminal rape? This deceptively simple question has baffled courts and scholars for more than a century. In an influential recent article, Yale Law Professor Jed Rubenfeld argued that our ambivalence towards this question generates what he called the “riddle of rape-by-deception”. The riddle is that if rape is defined as having sex without consent, then rape statutes should prohibit sex by deception just as much as they prohibit sex by force. Yet they don’t. So either rape statutes are guilty of a huge, inexplicable oversight or rape law is …


Actmissions, Luis E. Chiesa Jan 2013

Actmissions, Luis E. Chiesa

Journal Articles

Most observers agree that it is morally worse to cause harm by engaging in an act than to contribute to producing the same harm by an omission. As a result, American criminal law punishes harmful omissions less than similarly harmful acts, unless there are exceptional circumstances that warrant punishing them equally. Yet there are many cases in which actors cause harm by engaging in conduct that can be reasonably described as either an act or an omission. Think of a doctor who flips a switch that discontinues life support to a patient. If the patient dies as a result, did …


Consent Is Not A Defense To Battery: A Reply To Professor Bergelson, Luis E. Chiesa Jan 2011

Consent Is Not A Defense To Battery: A Reply To Professor Bergelson, Luis E. Chiesa

Journal Articles

In this essay I argue that, contrary to what most criminal law scholars believe, consent does not operate as a justification that relieves the actor of liability for conduct that admittedly satisfies the offense elements of battery. Rather, I contend that consent is only relevant to battery liability when, in conjunction with other factors, it modifies the definition of the crime in a way that reveals that the defendant’s act does not actually fall within the range of conduct prohibited by the offense. The argument proceeds in three parts.

In Part I, I argue that there are three ways of …