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Criminal Law

Columbia Law School

Series

Buffalo Criminal Law Review

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Law

Joel Feinberg On Crime And Punishment: Exploring The Relationship Between The Moral Limits Of The Criminal Law And The Expressive Function Of Punishment, Bernard Harcourt Jan 2001

Joel Feinberg On Crime And Punishment: Exploring The Relationship Between The Moral Limits Of The Criminal Law And The Expressive Function Of Punishment, Bernard Harcourt

Faculty Scholarship

When I was originally approached to participate in this Symposium on the work and legacy of Joel Feinberg, I immediately began thinking about the influence of his essay The Expressive Function of Punishment on contemporary criminal law theory in the United States. That essay has contributed significantly to a growing body of scholarship associated with the resurgence of interest inexpressive theories of law. In the criminal law area, the expressivist movement traces directly and foremost to Feinberg's essay. As Carol Steiker observes, "Joel Feinberg can be credited with inaugurating the "expressivist" turn in punishment theory with his influential essay, The …


The Place Of Victims In The Theory Of Retribution, George P. Fletcher Jan 1999

The Place Of Victims In The Theory Of Retribution, George P. Fletcher

Faculty Scholarship

Remarkably, the theory of criminal law has developed without paying much attention to the place of victims in the analysis of responsibility or in the rationale for punishment. You can read a first-rate book like Michael Moore's recent Placing Blame and not find a single reference to the relevance of victims in imposing liability and punishment. In the last several decades we have witnessed notable strides toward attending to the rights and interests of crime victims, but these concerns have yet to intrude upon the discussion of the central issues of wrongdoing, blame, and punishment.

Admittedly, victims and their sentiments …


Towards A Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The Challenge Of The Special Part, Gerard E. Lynch Jan 1998

Towards A Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The Challenge Of The Special Part, Gerard E. Lynch

Faculty Scholarship

The Model Penal Code is among the most successful academic law reform projects ever attempted. In the first two decades after its completion in 1962, more than two-thirds of the states undertook to enact new codifications of their criminal law, and virtually all of those used the Model Penal Code as a starting point. The Model Penal Code was influential in a variety of different ways. First, the very notion of a systematic codification of criminal law received a dramatic boost from the Model Penal Code. Apart from the degree to which any particular state recodification resembled the Model Penal …


Dogmas Of The Model Penal Code, George P. Fletcher Jan 1998

Dogmas Of The Model Penal Code, George P. Fletcher

Faculty Scholarship

The Model Penal Code has become the central document of American criminal justice. It has had some effect on law reform in over 35 states. More significantly, it provides the lingua franca of most people who teach criminal law in the United States. Most academics think that the precise definitions of culpability states in section 2.02(2) are really neat, and they applaud the liberal rules that restrict the use of strict liability to administrative fines. Indeed, all things considered, for a code drafted with almost total indifference to what might be learned from European models, the Model Penal Code is …


The Fall And Rise Of Criminal Theory, George P. Fletcher Jan 1998

The Fall And Rise Of Criminal Theory, George P. Fletcher

Faculty Scholarship

These are good times – at least for the theory of criminal law. This special issue of Buffalo Criminal Law Review testifies to a remarkable surge of interest among younger scholars in perennial questions: Why should we punish offenders? Do we require a human act as a precondition for liability and what is its structure? What does it mean for someone to be guilty or culpable for committing an offense? How do we avoid contradictions in structuring the criteria of liability? The time has come for renewed intensity in pondering and discussing these basic issues.

The contributions of this symposium …