Law Commons^™

Ambivalence About Treason, George P. Fletcher

Faculty Scholarship

Betrayal and disloyalty are grievous moral wrongs, yet today when the disloyal commit treason we seem reluctant to punish them. John Walker Lindh fought for the Taliban with full knowledge that it was engaged in hostilities against the United States. It should not have been so difficult to prove by two witnesses to the overt act, as the Constitution requires, that he adhered to the enemy giving them aid and comfort. Admittedly, there were legal problems about whether the Taliban as an indirect enemy in an undeclared war could qualify as the enemy in the constitutional sense. But there was …

Criminal Theory In The Twentieth Century, George P. Fletcher

Faculty Scholarship

The theoretical inquiry into the foundations of criminal law in the twentieth century, in both civil and common law traditions, is assayed by the consideration of seven main currents or trends. First, the structure of offenses is examined in light of the bipartite, tripartite, and quadripartite modes of analysis. Second, competing theories of culpability – normative and descriptive – are weighed in connection with their important ramifications for the presumption of proof and the allocation of the burden of persuasion on defenses. Third, the struggle with alternatives to punishment for the control and commitment of dangerous but non-criminal persons is …

The Nature And Function Of Criminal Theory, George P. Fletcher

Faculty Scholarship

The practice of teaching and writing in the field of criminal law has changed dramatically in the last half-century. In the United States and England, and to a lesser extent in other English-speaking countries, we have witnessed a turn toward theoretical inquires of a greater depth and variety than had existed previously in the history of Anglo-American law. The subjects of this new literature include the nature and rationale of punishment; the theory of justification and of excuse, that is, of wrongdoing and responsibility; the relevance of consequences to the gravity of offenses (the problem of moral luck); and the …

The Fall And Rise Of Criminal Theory, George P. Fletcher

Faculty Scholarship

These are good times – at least for the theory of criminal law. This special issue of Buffalo Criminal Law Review testifies to a remarkable surge of interest among younger scholars in perennial questions: Why should we punish offenders? Do we require a human act as a precondition for liability and what is its structure? What does it mean for someone to be guilty or culpable for committing an offense? How do we avoid contradictions in structuring the criteria of liability? The time has come for renewed intensity in pondering and discussing these basic issues.

The contributions of this symposium …

The Right Deed For The Wrong Reason: A Reply To Mr. Robinson, George P. Fletcher

Faculty Scholarship

So far as there is a school of criminal theory in the United States, it is a school devoted to sifting and celebrating the purposes of the criminal law. Discussions in the literature are dominated by endless recitals of the deterrent, rehabilitative and retributive functions of criminal sanctions. The orthodox view is that all of these purposes are relevant and that any proposed rule of criminal law must be measured by its tendency to further one or all of these goals. If the issue is punishing negligence, for example, the standard mode of analysis is to ask whether punishing negligent …

The Theory Of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis, George P. Fletcher

Faculty Scholarship

Negligence is a problematic ground for criminal liability. Every major Western legal system punishes negligent as well as intentional violations of protected interests; but theorists both here and abroad feel uneasy about the practice Negligent motoring and negligent manufacturing significantly threaten the public interest; yet Western judges seem more comfortable punishing counterfeiters and prostitutes than imposing sanctions against those who inadvertently take unreasonable risks. Negligence appears indeed to be an inferior, almost aberrant ground for criminal liability. Every interest protected by the criminal law is protected against intentional violations; but only a few-life, bodily integrity, and sometimes property-are secured against …