Law Commons^™

State Rejection Of Federal Law, Thomas B. Bennett

Faculty Publications

Sometimes the United States Supreme Court speaks, and states do not follow. For example, in 2003, the Arizona Supreme Court agreed to "reject" a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, because no "sound reasons justif[ied] following" it. Similarly, in 2006, Michigan voters approved a ballot initiative that, according to the legislature that drafted it, sought "at the very least to freeze' the state's ... law to prevent" state courts from following a ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court. Surprising though this language may be, there is nothing nefarious about these cases. Cooper v. Aaron this is not. Unlike more notorious …

Federalism, Convergence, And Divergence In Constitutional Property, Gerald S. Dickinson

Articles

Federal law exerts a gravitational force on state actors, resulting in widespread conformity to federal law and doctrine at the state level. This has been well recognized in the literature, but scholars have paid little attention to this phenomenon in the context of constitutional property. Traditionally, state takings jurisprudence—in both eminent domain and regulatory takings—has strongly gravitated towards the Supreme Court’s takings doctrine. This long history of federal-state convergence, however, was disrupted by the Court’s controversial public use decision in Kelo v. City of New London. In the wake of Kelo, states resisted the Court’s validation of the …

An Empirical Study Of Implicit Takings., James E. Krier, Stewart E. Sterk

Articles

Takings scholarship has long focused on the niceties of Supreme Court doctrine, while ignoring the operation of takings law "on the ground" in the state and lower federal courts, which together decide the vast bulk of all takings cases. This study, based primarily on an empirical analysis of more than 2000 reported decisions ovcr the period 1979 through 2012, attempts to fill that void. This study establishes that the Supreme Court's categorical rules govern almost no state takings cases, and that takings claims based on government regulation almost invariably fail. By contrast, when takings claims arise out of government action …

Inventing The Classical Constitution, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

One recurring call over a century of American constitutional thought is for return to a "classical" understanding of American federal and state Constitutions. "Classical" does not necessarily mean "originalist" or "interpretivist." Some classical views, such as the attempt to revitalize Lochner-style economic due process, find little support in the text of the federal Constitution or any of the contemporary state constitutions. Rather, constitutional meaning is thought to lie in a background link between constitution formation and classical statecraft. The core theory rests on the assumption of a social contract to which everyone in some initial position agreed. Like any contract, …

Judicial Takings: Musings On Stop The Beach, James E. Krier

Articles

Judicial takings weren’t much talked about until a few years ago, when the Stop the Beach case made them suddenly salient. The case arose from a Florida statute, enacted in 1961, that authorizes public restoration of eroded beaches by adding sand to widen them seaward. Under the statute, the state has title to any new dry land resulting from restored beaches, meaning that waterfront owners whose land had previously extended to the mean high-tide line end up with public beaches between their land and the water. This, the owners claimed, resulted in a taking of their property, more particularly their …

Suing Courts, Frederic Bloom, Christopher Serkin

Publications

This Article argues for a new and unexpected mechanism of judicial accountability: suing courts. Current models of court accountability focus almost entirely on correcting legal errors. A suit against the court would concentrate on something different--on providing transition relief, by way of legal remedy, to those bearing the heaviest burdens of desirable legal change. These suits may at first appear impossible. But suing courts is conceptually rational and mechanically reasonable, a tool that eases legal transitions while navigating the many hurdles modern doctrine puts in the way. This Article sets out the first complete account of how, where, and why …

Historical Evolution And Future Of Natural Resources Law And Policy: The Beginning Of An Argument And Some Modest Predictions, Sally K. Fairfax, Helen Ingram, Leigh Raymond

The Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

8 pages.

Includes bibliographical references

"Sally Fairfax, UC-Berkeley, Helen Ingram, UC-Irvine, and Leigh Raymond, Purdue University" -- Agenda

The Growing Influence Of Tort And Property Law On Natural Resources Law: Case Studies Of Coal Bed Methane Development And Geologic Carbon Sequestration, Alexandra B. Klass

The Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

19 pages.

"Alexandra B. Klass, Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School"

Law Casebook Description And Table Of Contents: Constitutional Environmental And Natural Resources Law [Outline], Jim May, Robin Craig

The Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

6 pages.

"James May, Widener University School of Law" -- Agenda

Political Institutions, Judicial Review, And Private Property: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, Daniel H. Cole

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Since Madison, jurists of all ideological stripes have more or less casually presumed that constitutional judicial review is absolutely necessary to protect private property rights against over-regulation by political bodies. During the twentieth century, this presumption led directly to the institution of regulatory takings doctrine.

Recently, the economist William Fischel and the legal scholar Neil Komesar have raised important questions about, respectively, the utility and the sufficiency of constitutional judicial review for protecting private property. This article supports their arguments with theoretical and historical evidence that constitutional judicial review (1) is not strictly necessary for protecting private property rights, and …

Public Ruses, James E. Krier, Christopher Serkin

Articles

The public use requirement of eminent domain law may be working its way back into the United States Constitution. To be sure, the words "public use" appear in the document-and in many state constitutions as well, but the federal provision applies to the states in any event-as one of the Fifth Amendment's limitations on the government's inherent power to take private property against the will of its owners. (The other limitation is that "just compensation" must be paid, of which more later.) Any taking of private property, the text suggests, must be for public use. Those words, however, have amounted …

Uncoupling The Law Of Takings, Michael A. Heller, James E. Krier

Articles

The law of takings couples together matters that should be treated independently. The conventional view, shared by courts and commentators alike, has been that any takings case can be resolved in one of two ways: either there is a taking and compensation is due, or there is no taking and no compensation is due. These results are fine as long as one holding or the other serves the two central concerns of the Takings Clause - eficiency and justice. But a problem arises when the two purposes behind the law of takings come into cordhct, as they readily might. It …

Agenda: Regulatory Takings And Resources: What Are The Constitutional Limits?, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center, Byron R. White Center For The Study Of American Constitutional Law

Regulatory Takings and Resources: What Are the Constitutional Limits? (Summer Conference, June 13-15)

Sponsored by the University of Colorado's Natural Resources Law Center and the Byron R. White Center for American Constitutional Study.

Conference organizers, faculty and/or moderators included University of Colorado School of Law professors David H. Getches, Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Gene R. Nichol, Jr. and Mark Squillace.

Governmental regulation for environmental protection and other important public purposes can affect the manner in which land and natural resources are developed and used. The U.S. constitution (and most state constitutions) prohibit the government from "taking" property without payment of compensation. Originally intended to apply to situations where the government physically seized private property …

Agenda: Water As A Public Resource: Emerging Rights And Obligations, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center

Water as a Public Resource: Emerging Rights and Obligations (Summer Conference, June 1-3)

Conference organizers and/or faculty included University of Colorado School of Law professors Lawrence J. MacDonnell, David H. Getches, and Charles F. Wilkinson.

This conference focused on the legal rights associated with a broad range of public uses and interests in water including recreation, fish and wildlife protection, and water quality. Evolving legal areas such as the public trust doctrine, instream flow laws, federal reserved rights, and wetlands protection were discussed.

Water as a Public Resource: Emerging Rights and Obligations considered the extension of the public trust doctrine to areas previously not covered by this concept, as well as developments in …

Book Review, Howard C. Klemme

Publications

No abstract provided.

Taking Of Equitable Easements For Public Use, Edgar N. Durfee

Articles

The case of Flynn v. New York &c Railway Co., decided by the Court of Appeals of New York in April last, involves the right of an owner of land to which is appurtenant a so-called equitable easement, arising under a covenant restricting the use of other land, to compensation upon the taking of the servient land for a public use inconsistent with the restriction. A tract of land was laid out in accordance with a plan, and all, lots therein were sold and conveyed by deeds containing covenants, inter alia, that, "No building or structure for any business purpose …