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- Articles (2)
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- Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works (2)
- Innovation in Western Water Law and Management (Summer Conference, June 5-7) (2)
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- All Faculty Scholarship (1)
- Colorado Water Issues and Options: The 90's and Beyond: Toward Maximum Beneficial Use of Colorado's Water Resources (October 8) (1)
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- Scholarly Works (1)
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- The Federal Land Policy and Management Act (Summer Conference, June 6-8) (1)
- The Public Lands During the Remainder of the 20th Century: Planning, Law, and Policy in the Federal Land Agencies (Summer Conference, June 8-10) (1)
Articles 1 - 18 of 18
Full-Text Articles in Law
Interpreting State Statutes In Federal Court, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
Interpreting State Statutes In Federal Court, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
Faculty Publications
This Article addresses a problem that potentially arises whenever a federal court encounters a state statute. When interpreting the state statute, should the federal court use the state’s methods of statutory interpretation—the state’s canons of construction, its rules about the use of legislative history, and the like—or should the court instead use federal methods of statutory interpretation? The question is interesting as a matter of theory, and it is practically significant because different jurisdictions have somewhat different interpretive approaches. In addressing itself to this problem, the Article makes two contributions. First, it shows, as a normative matter, that federal courts …
Rwu Law News: The Newsletter Of Roger Williams University School Of Law, Michael M. Bowden, Gregory W. Bowman, Brooklyn Crockton
Rwu Law News: The Newsletter Of Roger Williams University School Of Law, Michael M. Bowden, Gregory W. Bowman, Brooklyn Crockton
Life of the Law School (1993- )
No abstract provided.
Enacted Legislative Findings And The Deference Problem, Daniel A. Crane
Enacted Legislative Findings And The Deference Problem, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
The constitutionality of federal legislation sometimes turns on the presence and sufficiency of congressional findings of predicate facts, such as the effects of conduct on interstate commerce, state discrimination justifying the abrogation of sovereign immunity, or market failures justifying intrusions on free speech. Sometimes a congressional committee makes these findings in legislative history. Other times, Congress recites its findings in a statutory preamble, thus enacting its findings as law. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has not distinguished between enacted and unenacted findings in deciding how much deference to accord congressional findings. This is striking because the difference between enactedness and unenactedness …
Judicial Review Before Marbury, William Michael Treanor
Judicial Review Before Marbury, William Michael Treanor
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
While scholars have long probed the original understanding of judicial review and the early judicial review case law, this article presents a study of the judicial review case law in the United States before Marbury v. Madison that is dramatically more complete than prior work and that challenges previous scholarship on the original understanding of judicial review on the two most critical dimensions: how well judicial review was established at the time of the Founding and when it was exercised. Where prior work argues that judicial review was rarely exercised before Marbury (or that it was created in Marbury), …
A Government Of Laws And Not Men: Prohibiting Non-Precedential Opinions By Statute Or Procedural Rule, Amy E. Sloan
A Government Of Laws And Not Men: Prohibiting Non-Precedential Opinions By Statute Or Procedural Rule, Amy E. Sloan
All Faculty Scholarship
Non-precedential judicial opinions issued by the federal appellate courts have generated significant controversy. Given that the federal appellate courts are unlikely to abandon the practice of issuing non-precedential opinions on their own, what other options exist for prohibiting the practice? This article discusses the constitutionality of a procedural rule or statute prohibiting the federal appellate courts from prospectively designating selected opinions as non-precedential. It explains how the rules governing non-precedential opinions allow federal appellate courts to "opt out" of their own rules of precedent. It then examines the rulemaking process, showing how the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are promulgated …
Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature Of Statutory Interpretation, Morell E. Mullins Sr.
Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature Of Statutory Interpretation, Morell E. Mullins Sr.
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Modifying The Kentucky Rules Of Evidence—A Separation Of Powers Issue, Robert G. Lawson
Modifying The Kentucky Rules Of Evidence—A Separation Of Powers Issue, Robert G. Lawson
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles
How do you modify laws that simultaneously exist as statutes and rules of court? For reasons that are described elsewhere and need not be repeated here, the Kentucky Rules of Evidence (K.R.E.) came into existence through concurrent enactment by the General Assembly and Kentucky Supreme Court and thus are endowed with all the attributes of both statutes and rules of court. So, how do you change them when the inevitable need to do so arises, a question made both interesting and difficult by the fact that there is no institutional mechanism for concurrent lawmaking by the General Assembly and supreme …
Interpretation Of The Kentucky Rules Of Evidence—What Happened To The Common Law?, Robert G. Lawson
Interpretation Of The Kentucky Rules Of Evidence—What Happened To The Common Law?, Robert G. Lawson
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles
The Kentucky Rules of Evidence, which became effective on July 1, 1992, dramatically transformed the method by which lawyers and judges address evidence issues. Before the adoption of the Rules, the law of evidence consisted mostly of a vast collection of common law rulings, accumulated over two centuries and inaccessible to lawyers and judges for all practical purposes. In addressing an evidence issue, participants had to first deal with the problem of "finding" the law-distilling from a morass of conflicting common law precedents the ones applicable to the issue at hand, a task regularly producing contention rather than agreement and, …
Prospective Overruling And The Revival Of ‘Unconstitutional' Statutes, William Michael Treanor, Gene B. Sperling
Prospective Overruling And The Revival Of ‘Unconstitutional' Statutes, William Michael Treanor, Gene B. Sperling
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey reshaped the law of abortion in this country. The Court overturned two of its previous decisions invalidating state restrictions on abortions, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, and it abandoned the trimester analytic framework established in Roe v. Wade. At the time Casey was handed down, twenty states had restrictive abortion statutes on the books that were in conflict with Akron or Thornburgh and which were unenforced. In six of these states, courts had held the statutes unconstitutional. Almost …
Agenda: Innovation In Western Water Law And Management, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center
Agenda: Innovation In Western Water Law And Management, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center
Innovation in Western Water Law and Management (Summer Conference, June 5-7)
Conference organizers and/or faculty included University of Colorado School of Law professors Lawrence J. MacDonnell, David H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson and Richard B. Collins.
Pressures of population, drought, and changing water use have provided the impetus for numerous innovations in water law and management in recent years. The Center's annual conference June 5-7, 1991, will look at innovation and change in five areas--water planning, special water management areas, negotiated settlements of tribal water rights, conjunctive use of ground and surface water, and public values in water decision making. Each session will begin with talks by experts from several western …
Kansas Intensive Groundwater Use Control Areas, David L. Pope
Kansas Intensive Groundwater Use Control Areas, David L. Pope
Innovation in Western Water Law and Management (Summer Conference, June 5-7)
22 pages (includes maps).
Contains references.
Planning As A Major Tool Of Public Land Management, John D. Leshy
Planning As A Major Tool Of Public Land Management, John D. Leshy
The Public Lands During the Remainder of the 20th Century: Planning, Law, and Policy in the Federal Land Agencies (Summer Conference, June 8-10)
25 pages.
The Development Of Colorado’S Water Law, Raphael J. Moses
The Development Of Colorado’S Water Law, Raphael J. Moses
Colorado Water Issues and Options: The 90's and Beyond: Toward Maximum Beneficial Use of Colorado's Water Resources (October 8)
23 pages.
Contains references (pages 22 - 23).
Constitutional Remedies For Underinclusive Statutes: A Critical Appraisal Of Heckler V. Mathews, Bruce K. Miller
Constitutional Remedies For Underinclusive Statutes: A Critical Appraisal Of Heckler V. Mathews, Bruce K. Miller
Faculty Scholarship
The power of the federal courts to remedy injuries caused by constitutional violations is a fundamental assumption of our constitutional scheme. The Supreme Court's equal protection decisions of the past generation illustrate the extent to which we take this power completely for granted. When confronted with a statute that denies a litigant's fifth or fourteenth amendment right to equal treatment, the Court has rarely limited itself to a simple declaration that the statute is unconstitutional. Such declarations, rather, have been routinely accompanied by awards of often substantial relief to the persons injured by the unconstitutional inequality. The author analyzes Heckler …
Wilderness And The Public Lands, John D. Leshy
Wilderness And The Public Lands, John D. Leshy
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act (Summer Conference, June 6-8)
18 pages (includes chart).
Medical Dependency In Arizona, Mary E. Berkheiser
Medical Dependency In Arizona, Mary E. Berkheiser
Scholarly Works
Analysis of In re Cochise County Juvenile Action No. 5666-J, 650 P.2d 459 (Ariz. 1982).
Commissioner Of Internal Revenue V. First Security Bank Of Utah, Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Commissioner Of Internal Revenue V. First Security Bank Of Utah, Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Supreme Court Case Files
No abstract provided.
Power Of Judiciary To Declare A Law Unconstitutional, Charles A. Kent
Power Of Judiciary To Declare A Law Unconstitutional, Charles A. Kent
Articles
The judiciary has no power to declare a law unconstitutional unless it conflicts with some provision of the State or Federal Constitution. It will be the purpose of this article to show the reasonableness and meaning of this principle.