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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Scope Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel Mar 2015

The Scope Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel

Randy J Kozel

The scope of Supreme Court precedent is capacious. Justices of the Court commonly defer to sweeping rationales and elaborate doctrinal frameworks articulated by their predecessors. This practice infuses judicial precedent with the prescriptive power of enacted constitutional and statutory text. The lower federal courts follow suit, regularly abiding by the Supreme Court’s broad pronouncements. These phenomena cannot be explained by—and, indeed, oftentimes subvert—the classic distinction between binding holdings and dispensable dicta. This Article connects the scope of precedent with recurring and foundational debates about the proper ends of judicial interpretation. A precedent’s forward- looking effect should not depend on the …


Schoolhouses, Courthouses, And Statehouses: Educational Finance, Constitutional Structure, And The Separation Of Powers Doctrine, Michael Heise Feb 2015

Schoolhouses, Courthouses, And Statehouses: Educational Finance, Constitutional Structure, And The Separation Of Powers Doctrine, Michael Heise

Michael Heise

No abstract provided.


The Ordinary Remand Rule And The Judicial Toolbox For Agency Dialogue, Christopher J. Walker Jan 2014

The Ordinary Remand Rule And The Judicial Toolbox For Agency Dialogue, Christopher J. Walker

Christopher J. Walker

When a court concludes that an agency’s decision is erroneous, the ordinary rule is to remand to the agency to consider the issue anew (as opposed to the court deciding the issue itself). Despite that the Supreme Court first articulated this ordinary remand rule in the 1940s and has rearticulated it repeatedly over the years, little work has been done to understand how the rule works in practice, much less whether it promotes the separation-of-powers values that motivate the rule. This Article is the first to conduct such an investigation—focusing on judicial review of agency immigration adjudications and reviewing the …


The Death Of Tax Court Exceptionalism, Stephanie Hoffer, Christopher J. Walker Jan 2014

The Death Of Tax Court Exceptionalism, Stephanie Hoffer, Christopher J. Walker

Christopher J. Walker

Tax exceptionalism—the view that tax law does not have to play by the administrative law rules that govern the rest of the regulatory state—has come under attack in recent years. In 2011, the Supreme Court rejected such exceptionalism by holding that judicial review of the Treasury Department’s interpretations of the tax code is subject to the same Chevron deference regime that applies throughout the administrative state. The D.C. Circuit followed suit by rejecting the IRS’s position that its notices are not subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). This Article calls for the demise of another instance …


Executive Power In Youngstown's Shadows, Patricia L. Bellia Oct 2013

Executive Power In Youngstown's Shadows, Patricia L. Bellia

Patricia L. Bellia

Fifty years after it was handed down, the Supreme Court's decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer is among the most important of the Court's separation of powers cases. This Article explores two quite different legacies of the Youngstown case. First, Youngstown has a symbolic or rhetorical power, in that it stands as an example of a court invalidating the actions of a coordinate branch of government in a politically delicate context. When a court wields this weapon, it can take some cover in Youngstown's shadows, and the possibility of a court exercising this power disciplines the executive …


State Courts And The Interpretation Of Federal Statutes, Anthony J. Bellia Oct 2013

State Courts And The Interpretation Of Federal Statutes, Anthony J. Bellia

Anthony J. Bellia

Scholars have long debated the separation of powers question of what judicial power federal courts have under Article III of the Constitution in the enterprise of interpreting federal statutes. Specifically, scholars have debated whether, in light of Founding-era English and state court judicial practice, the judicial power of the United States should be understood as a power to interpret statutes dynamically or as faithful agents of Congress. This Article argues that the question of how courts should interpret federal statutes is one not only of separation of powers but of federalism as well. State courts have a vital and often …


Three-Dimensional Sovereign Immunity, Sarah L. Brinton Mar 2013

Three-Dimensional Sovereign Immunity, Sarah L. Brinton

Sarah L Brinton

The Supreme Court has erred on sovereign immunity. The current federal immunity doctrine wrongly gives Congress the exclusive authority to waive immunity (“exclusive congressional waiver”), but the Constitution mandates that Congress share the waiver power with the Court. This Article develops the doctrine of a two-way shared waiver and then explores a third possibility: the sharing of the immunity waiver power among all three branches of government.