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In Defense Of A Little Judiciary: A Textual And Constitutional Foundation For Chevron, Terence J. Mccarrick Jr.
In Defense Of A Little Judiciary: A Textual And Constitutional Foundation For Chevron, Terence J. Mccarrick Jr.
San Diego Law Review
This Article hopes to help fill that “important gap in the administrative law literature.” And it proceeds in three parts. Part II offers a brief history of the Chevron doctrine and its discontents. It traces the doctrine’s origin and scope and ends by articulating the textualist and originalist critique of Chevron described above. Part III grapples with that criticism and offers a textualist and originalist defense of Chevron. Section III.A describes the textual footing for Chevron in the APA and argues that Chevron—if not commanded by the APA—does not upset the role it envisions for courts. Section III.B describes the …
The Pragmatism Of Interpretation: A Review Of Richard A. Posner, The Federal Judiciary, Amul R. Thapar, Benjamin Beaton
The Pragmatism Of Interpretation: A Review Of Richard A. Posner, The Federal Judiciary, Amul R. Thapar, Benjamin Beaton
Michigan Law Review
A review of Richard A. Posner, The Federal Judiciary.
High-Stakes Interpretation, Ryan D. Doerfler
High-Stakes Interpretation, Ryan D. Doerfler
Michigan Law Review
Courts look at text differently in high-stakes cases. Statutory language that would otherwise be “unambiguous” suddenly becomes “less than clear.” This, in turn, frees up courts to sidestep constitutional conflicts, avoid dramatic policy changes, and, more generally, get around undesirable outcomes. The standard account of this behavior is that courts’ failure to recognize “clear” or “unambiguous” meanings in such cases is motivated or disingenuous, and, at best, justified on instrumentalist grounds.
This Article challenges that account. It argues instead that, as a purely epistemic matter, it is more difficult to “know” what a text means—and, hence, more difficult to regard …