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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Accounting: Habeas Corpus And Enemy Combatants, Emily Calhoun
The Accounting: Habeas Corpus And Enemy Combatants, Emily Calhoun
Publications
The judiciary should impose a heavy burden of justification on the executive when a habeas petitioner challenges the accuracy of facts on which an enemy combatant designation rests. A heavy burden of justification will ensure that the essential institutional purposes of the writ--and legitimate, separated-powers government--are preserved, even during times of national exigency. The institutional purposes of the writ argue for robust judicial review rather than deference to the executive. Moreover, the procedural flexibility traditionally associated with the writ gives the judiciary the tools to ensure that a heavy burden of justification can be imposed.
Towards A Constitutional Architecture For Cooperative Federalism, Philip J. Weiser
Towards A Constitutional Architecture For Cooperative Federalism, Philip J. Weiser
Publications
In this Article, Professor Weiser calls for a new conception of federal-state relations to justify existing political practice under cooperative federalism regulatory programs. In particular, Professor Weiser highlights how Congress favors cooperative federalism programs--that combine federal and state authority in creative ways--and has rejected the dual federalism model of regulation--with separate spheres of state and federal authority that current judicial rhetoric often celebrates. Given the increasing dissonance between prevailing political practice and judicial rhetoric, courts will ultimately have to confront three fault lines for current cooperative federalism programs: the legal source of authority for state agencies to implement federal law, …
Recent Developments, An Appeal By Any Other Name: Congress's Empty Victory Over Habeas Rights--Felker V. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996), Scott Moss
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No abstract provided.
Initiative Enigmas, Richard Collins
The Federalist Papers: The Framers Construct An Orrery, Harold H. Bruff
The Federalist Papers: The Framers Construct An Orrery, Harold H. Bruff
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No abstract provided.
Specialized Courts In Administrative Law, Harold H. Bruff
Specialized Courts In Administrative Law, Harold H. Bruff
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No abstract provided.
Separation Of Powers Under The Texas Constitution, Harold H. Bruff
Separation Of Powers Under The Texas Constitution, Harold H. Bruff
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No abstract provided.
Public Programs, Private Deciders: The Constitutionality Of Arbitration In Federal Programs, Harold H. Bruff
Public Programs, Private Deciders: The Constitutionality Of Arbitration In Federal Programs, Harold H. Bruff
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No abstract provided.
The Legislative Veto, The Constitution, And The Courts, Robert F. Nagel
The Legislative Veto, The Constitution, And The Courts, Robert F. Nagel
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No abstract provided.
Controlling The Structural Injunction, Robert F. Nagel
Controlling The Structural Injunction, Robert F. Nagel
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No abstract provided.
Separation Of Powers And The Scope Of Federal Equitable Remedies, Robert F. Nagel
Separation Of Powers And The Scope Of Federal Equitable Remedies, Robert F. Nagel
Publications
No abstract provided.
Congressional Control Of Administrative Regulation: A Study Of Legislative Vetoes, Harold H. Bruff, Ernest Gellhorn
Congressional Control Of Administrative Regulation: A Study Of Legislative Vetoes, Harold H. Bruff, Ernest Gellhorn
Publications
Several administrative programs contain provisions allowing Congress to veto agency rules, and there is now a bill before Congress to extend this veto power to all agency rulemaking. In this Article, Professor Bruff and Dean Gellhorn analyze the histories of five federal programs subject to the legislative veto to determine the effect of the veto on the rulemaking process and on the relationships between the branches of government. Extrapolating from this practical experience, they suggest that a general legislative veto is unlikely to increase the overall efficiency of the administrative process, may impede the achievement of reasoned decisionmaking based on …