Law Commons^™

The Federal Question Jurisdiction Under Article Iii: “First In The Minds Of The Framers,” But Today, Perhaps, Falling Short Of The Framers’ Expectations, Arthur D. Hellman

Articles

As Chief Justice Marshall explained, “the primary motive” for creating a “judicial department” for the new national government was “the desire of having a [national] tribunal for the decision of all national questions.” Thus, although Article III of the Constitution lists nine kinds of “Cases” and “Controversies” to which the “judicial Power” of the United States “shall extend,” “the objects which stood first in the minds of the framers” were the cases “arising under” the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. Today we refer to this as the federal question jurisdiction.

Of all federal question cases, the Framers …

Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles And Constitutional Truths, Timothy Zick

Timothy Zick

The absence of neutrality and objectivity in constitutional decision-making has vexed scholars and courts. In this Article, the author describes and analyzes "constitutional empiricism," a trend instituted by the Rehnquist Court, which is characterized by judicial reliance in constitutional review on empirical and scientific conventions and processes. Courts have generally relied upon traditional sources, such as text and history, to interpret consititutional powers and rights. In its search for neutrality and objectivity, however, the Court has recently turned not only to social science and other data, which are fast becoming common sources of interpretation, but also to the precepts and …

Constitutional Avoidance And The Roberts Court, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

Judicial Review And Constitutional Interpretation In Afghanistan: A Case Of Inconsistency, Shoaib Timory

Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Cost Of The Text, Richard A. Primus

Articles

Christopher Serkin and Nelson Tebbe's Is the Constitution Special?explores many facets of constitutional interpretation. I will focus here on their observation that constitutional interpretation is "less textual" than statutory interpretation. I place the expression "less textual" in quotation marks because "textual" could mean many things, such that it would often be problematic to characterize one interpretive exercise as more or less textual than another. In Serkin and Tebbe's view, as I understand it, mainstream constitutional interpretation is "less textual " than statutory decisionmaking in that it is less constrained by the words of particular enacted clauses. As a convenient …

Justice Scalia’S Bottom-Up Approach To Shaping The Law, Meghan J. Ryan

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Justice Antonin Scalia is among the most famous Supreme Court Justices in history. He is known for his originalism and conservative positions, as well as his witty and acerbic legal opinions. One of the reasons Justice Scalia’s opinions are so memorable is his effective use of rhetorical devices, which convey colorful images and understandable ideas. One might expect that such powerful opinions would be effective in shaping the law, but Justice Scalia’s judicial philosophy was often too conservative to persuade a majority of his fellow Justices on the Supreme Court. Further, his regular criticisms of his Supreme Court colleagues were …

Keeping Pace: The U.S. Supreme Court And Evolving Technology, Brian Thomas

Politics Summer Fellows

Contemporary mainstream discussions of the Supreme Court are often qualified with the warning that the nine justices are out of touch with everyday American life, especially when it comes to the newest and most popular technologies. For instance, during oral argument for City of Ontario v. Quon, a 2010 case that dealt with sexting on government-issued devices, Chief Justice John Roberts famously asked what the difference was “between email and a pager,” and Justice Antonin Scalia wondered if the “spicy little conversations” held via text message could be printed and distributed. While these comments have garnered a great deal of …

Magic Words, Kiel Brennan-Marquez

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Broadly speaking, this Article has two goals. The first is to demonstrate the prominence of functionalism in the interpretive practices of the Supreme Court. Reading a case like NFIB, it would be easy to conclude that the tension between labels and function reflects a deep rift in our legal order. On reflection, though, the rift turns out to be something of a mirage. While judicial opinions do occasionally employ the rhetoric of label-formalism, we are all functionalists at heart.

The Article’s second goal is to explore two exceptions to this norm. One is a faux exception—an exception to functionalism that …

Plenary No Longer: How The Fourteenth Amendment "Amended" Congressional Jurisdiction-Stripping Power, Maggie Blackhawk

All Faculty Scholarship

This Note proposes a solution to the long-standing debate among federal courts scholars as to where to draw the limits of congressional power to strip appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court and to strip original jurisdiction from the lower federal courts. Although the Supreme Court has rarely addressed the possibility of limitations on congressional jurisdiction-stripping power, the few determinative cases to go before the Court reveal an acceptance of the orthodox view of plenary power. Proponents of the orthodox view maintain that state courts, bound to hear constitutional claims by their general jurisdictional grant and to enforce the Constitution by …

The Subjects Of The Constitution, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Two centuries after Marbury v. Madison, there remains a deep confusion about quite what a court is reviewing when it engages in judicial review. Conventional wisdom has it that judicial review is the review of certain legal objects: statutes, regulations. But strictly speaking, this is not quite right. The Constitution prohibits not objects but actions. Judicial review is the review of such actions. And actions require actors: verbs require subjects. So before judicial review focuses on verbs, let alone objects, it should begin at the beginning, with subjects. Every constitutional inquiry should begin with a basic question that has been …

Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride And Precedent Amidst The Cacophy Of Concurrences, And Re-Percolation After Rapanos, Donald J. Kochan, Melissa M. Berry, Matthew J. Parlow

Donald J. Kochan

Conflicts created by concurrences and pluralities in court decisions create confusion in law and lower court interpretation. Rule of law values require that individuals be able to identify controlling legal principles. That task is complicated when pluralities and concurrences contribute to the vagueness or uncertainty that leaves us wondering what the controlling rule is or attempting to predict what it will evolve to become. The rule of law is at least handicapped when continuity or confidence or confusion infuse our understanding of the applicable rules. This Article uses the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rapanos v. United States to …

Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride And Precedent Amidst The Cacophony Of Concurrences, And Re-Percolation After Rapanos, Matthew J. Parlow, Donald J. Kochan

Matthew Parlow

Constitutional Avoidance And The Roberts Court, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles And Constitutional Truths, Timothy Zick

Faculty Publications

The absence of neutrality and objectivity in constitutional decision-making has vexed scholars and courts. In this Article, the author describes and analyzes "constitutional empiricism," a trend instituted by the Rehnquist Court, which is characterized by judicial reliance in constitutional review on empirical and scientific conventions and processes. Courts have generally relied upon traditional sources, such as text and history, to interpret consititutional powers and rights. In its search for neutrality and objectivity, however, the Court has recently turned not only to social science and other data, which are fast becoming common sources of interpretation, but also to the precepts and …

What's In A Name? The Constitutionality Of Multiple "Supreme" Courts, David E. Engdahl

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.