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Full-Text Articles in Law
State V. Violette: Harsher Resentencing Encounters A Bolder Resumption Of Vindictiveness, Thomas C. Bradley
State V. Violette: Harsher Resentencing Encounters A Bolder Resumption Of Vindictiveness, Thomas C. Bradley
Maine Law Review
Twenty-one years ago, in Weeks v. State, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, adopted a rule to prevent judicial vindictiveness when resentencing defendants who had successfully appealed their conviction and been reconvicted. The Weeks court adopted as a state due process protection the United States Supreme Court's rule laid down the preceding year in North Carolina v. Pearce. The Pearce rule provides that harsher resentencing of such defendants creates a presumption of constitutionally prohibited vindictiveness unless the harsher sentence is explicitly based on some identifiable misconduct by the defendant since the prior sentencing. Thus, the Law …
Our Unconstitutional Recusal Procedure, Dmitry Bam
Our Unconstitutional Recusal Procedure, Dmitry Bam
Faculty Publications
In this article, I argue that the recusal procedure used in state and federal courts for nearly all of American history is unconstitutional. For centuries, recusal procedure in the United States has largely resembled that of England before American independence. To this day, in most American courtrooms, the judge hearing the case decides whether recusal is required under the applicable substantive recusal rules. If the judge determines that she can act impartially, or that her impartiality could not reasonably be questioned, the judge remains on the case. And although the judge’s decision is typically subject to appellate review — with …
Understanding Caperton: Judicial Disqualification Under The Due Process Clause, Dmitry Bam
Understanding Caperton: Judicial Disqualification Under The Due Process Clause, Dmitry Bam
Faculty Publications
It is virtually impossible to discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. without hearing some variant of the following response: “I can’t believe it was as close as it was.” And it does not matter whether you are chatting with your next-door neighbor who had never thought about judicial ethics in his life or discussing the case with a judicial-recusal expert. Nearly everyone seems to agree: Caperton was an “easy” case and that four justices dissented is an indication that there is something terribly wrong. Not only has Caperton elevated the issue of judicial impartiality …