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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
La Cassazione Sull'equiparazione Delle Polizze Unit Linked A Strumenti Finanziari, Valerio Sangiovanni
La Cassazione Sull'equiparazione Delle Polizze Unit Linked A Strumenti Finanziari, Valerio Sangiovanni
Valerio Sangiovanni
No abstract provided.
Waging War On Specialty Pharmaceutical Tiering In Pharmacy Benefit Design, Chad I. Brooker
Waging War On Specialty Pharmaceutical Tiering In Pharmacy Benefit Design, Chad I. Brooker
Chad I Brooker
Specialty drugs represent a growing concern for both health insurance issuers and beneficiaries given their exceedingly high (and growing) costs—representing almost half of all drug spend by 2017. Payers have sought to reduce their specialty drug spend by sharing more of the cost of these drugs with the beneficiaries who depend on them through the creation of specialty drug tiers. This has forced some patients to choose between forgoing other needs to pay for their medications or not take them at all. While several states have sought to outlaw the use of specialty drug tiers or limit pharmaceutical OOP cost-sharing, …
Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French
Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French
Journal Articles
In his recent article, Professor Richard Squire offers a provocative theory in which he claims the underlying claimants in shareholder litigation against corporate policyholders are overcompensated due to what he describes as “cramdown” settlements, under which insurers are forced to settle due to the “duty to contribute” that arises under multi-layered directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance programs. He also offers a novel idea regarding how this problem could be fixed by what he refers to as “segmented” settlements in which each insurer and the policyholder would be allowed to settle separately and consider only its own interests in doing so. …
The Competitive Consequences Of Most-Favored-Nation Provisions, Jonathan Baker, Judith A. Chevalier
The Competitive Consequences Of Most-Favored-Nation Provisions, Jonathan Baker, Judith A. Chevalier
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
"Most Favored Nation" contractual provisions have come under scrutiny in recent years by antitrust authorities in both the US and EU. MFNs are a type of vertical agreement between suppliers and buyers. The literature has recognized that there may be efficiency rationales for these arrangements but the literature has also recognized that these arrangements have anticompetitive potential. In this paper, we distill the economics literature on MFNs to explore both possibilities.
Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French
Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French
Christopher C. French
In his recent article, Professor Richard Squire offers a provocative theory in which he claims the underlying claimants in shareholder litigation against corporate policyholders are overcompensated due to what he describes as “cramdown” settlements, under which insurers are forced to settle due to the “duty to contribute” that arises under multi-layered directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance programs. He also offers a novel idea regarding how this problem could be fixed by what he refers to as “segmented” settlements in which each insurer and the policyholder would be allowed to settle separately and consider only its own interests in doing so. …