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Full-Text Articles in Law

Conflicting Visions: A Critique Of Ian Macneil’S Relational Theory Of Contract, Randy E. Barnett Jan 1992

Conflicting Visions: A Critique Of Ian Macneil’S Relational Theory Of Contract, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Perhaps the leading contemporary critic of placing consent at the center of contract law has been Ian Macneil. In his book The New Social Contract as well as in a series of complex and richly textured articles spanning nearly two decades, Macneil has eloquently presented and defended his now well-known relational theory of contract. It is a tribute to the important core of previously neglected truth in Macneil's theory that, for all its complexity, the theory can be summarized succinctly.

Macneil presents nothing less than a "holistic" "social theory" of human exchange--with particular emphasis on the human activity of "projecting …


The Sound Of Silence: Default Rules And Contractual Consent, Randy E. Barnett Jan 1992

The Sound Of Silence: Default Rules And Contractual Consent, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this article, the author challenges the received wisdom of "gap-filling in the absence of consent" by showing how the concept of default rules bolsters the theoretical importance of consent. He accomplishes this by expanding and refining his analysis of a "consent theory of contract." The author proposes that the concept of default rules reveals consent to be operating at two distinct levels of contract theory. First, the presence of consent to be legally bound is essential to justify the legal enforcement of any default rules. Second, nested within this overall consent to be legally bound, consent also operates to …


Some Problems With Contract As Promise, Randy E. Barnett Jan 1992

Some Problems With Contract As Promise, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The promise theory views the origin of contract in the making of a promise. This means that it views the creation of contracts as arising, in an important part, from the voluntary acts of promisors rather than from third parties like the State. In this regard, the theory facilitates the classical liberal value of freedom to contract. The promise theory also supports the notion that contracts should be interpreted according to the terms of the promise rather than by imposing terms on the parties. In this regard, the theory facilitates the classical liberal value of freedom from contract. These strengths …


Corporate Takeover Of Teaching Hospitals, Maxwell Gregg Bloche Jan 1992

Corporate Takeover Of Teaching Hospitals, Maxwell Gregg Bloche

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article explores the potential and the dangers of this novel form of collaboration between academic medicine and the for-profit world. The author focuses on those arrangements--purchases and leasing agreements--by which investor-owned corporations operate, for a profit, hospitals that serve as major medical teaching and research sites. He begins by reviewing how the evolving needs of academic medical centers and for-profit hospital chains have generated mutual interest in such arrangements. The author then considers some frequently expressed ethical, economic, and other public policy objections to the provision of hospital services by for-profit firms. Opponents of the acquisition and leasing of …


Rational Bargaining Theory And Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, The Duty To Disclose, And Fraud, Randy E. Barnett Jan 1992

Rational Bargaining Theory And Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, The Duty To Disclose, And Fraud, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The author begins by responding to Coleman's rational choice approach to choosing default rules. In part I, he applies the expanded analysis of contractual consent and default rules that he had recently presented elsewhere to explain how rational bargaining, hypothetical consent, and actual consent figure in the determination of contractual default rules. Whereas Coleman advocates the centrality of rational bargaining analysis to this determination, the author explains why rational bargaining theory's role must be subsidiary to that of consent.

The author then turns his attention to Coleman's appraisal of contracting parties' duty to disclose information concerning the resources that are …