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Articles 1 - 28 of 28
Full-Text Articles in Law
Investigating The Contract Production Process, Stephen J. Choi, Robert E. Scott, G. Mitu Gulati
Investigating The Contract Production Process, Stephen J. Choi, Robert E. Scott, G. Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
Contract law and theory have traditionally paid little attention to the processes by which contracts are made. Instead, contracts among sophisticated parties are assumed to be full articulations of the desires of the parties; whatever the process, the outcome is the same. This article compares sovereign debt contracts from US and UK firms, with different production processes, that are trying to do the same thing under very similar legal regimes. We find that that the production process likely matters quite a bit to the final form that contracts take.
Stay In The Fight With Civility And Professionalism, David Spratt
Stay In The Fight With Civility And Professionalism, David Spratt
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
Indiana And Doux Commerce, Nathan B. Oman
The Need For A Law Of Church And Market, Nathan B. Oman
The Need For A Law Of Church And Market, Nathan B. Oman
Faculty Publications
This Essay uses Helfand and Richman’s fine article to raise the question of the law of church and market. In Part I, I argue that the question of religion’s proper relationship to the market is more than simply another aspect of the church-state debates. Rather, it is a topic deserving explicit reflection in its own right. In Part II, I argue that Helfand and Richman demonstrate the danger of creating the law of church and market by accident. Courts and legislators do this when they resolve questions religious commerce poses by applying legal theories developed without any thought for the …
Defects In Consent And Dividing The Benefit Of The Bargain: Recent Developments, Jeffrey L. Harrison
Defects In Consent And Dividing The Benefit Of The Bargain: Recent Developments, Jeffrey L. Harrison
UF Law Faculty Publications
Contract law professors and students, attorneys, judges know that discussions about consent are rarely about consent. This results from three factors. First, it is the appearance of consent that is necessary to form a contract. Second, not every manifestation of consent is sufficient to create a contract that cannot be avoided. Third, interpretations of consent have the potential to allow courts to intervene when the benefit of the bargain is seen to be unfairly divided or one of the parties is actually worse off as a result of the contract. This Article assesses the extent to which recent decisions about …
Markets As A Moral Foundation For Contract Law, Nathan B. Oman
Markets As A Moral Foundation For Contract Law, Nathan B. Oman
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
The “Ensuing Loss” Clause In Insurance Policies: The Forgotten And Misunderstood Antidote To Anti-Concurrent Causation Exclusions, Chris French
Journal Articles
As a result of the 1906 earthquake and fire in San Francisco which destroyed the city, a clause known as the “ensuing loss” clause was created to address concurrent causation situations in which a loss follows both a covered peril and an excluded peril. Ensuing loss clauses appear in the exclusions section of such policies and in essence they provide that coverage for a loss caused by an excluded peril is nonetheless covered if the loss “ensues” from a covered peril. Today, ensuing loss clauses are found in “all risk” property and homeowners policies, which cover all losses except for …
Freedom Of Contract In An Augmented Reality: The Case Of Consumer Contracts, Scott R. Peppet
Freedom Of Contract In An Augmented Reality: The Case Of Consumer Contracts, Scott R. Peppet
Publications
This Article argues that freedom of contract will take on different meaning in a world in which new technology makes information about places, goods, people, firms, and contract terms available to contracting parties anywhere, at any time. In particular, our increasingly "augmented reality" calls into question leading justifications for distrusting consumer contracts and strengthens traditional understandings of freedom of contract. This is largely a descriptive and predictive argument: This Article aims to introduce contract law to these technologies and consider their most likely effects. It certainly has normative implications, however. Given that the vast majority of consumer contracting occurs in …
Contracts As Organizations, D. Gordon Smith, Brayden G. King
Contracts As Organizations, D. Gordon Smith, Brayden G. King
Faculty Scholarship
Empirical studies of contracts have become more common over the past decade, but the range of questions addressed by these studies is narrow, inspired primarily by economic theories that focus on the role of contracts in mitigating ex post opportunism. We contend that these economic theories do not adequately explain many commonly observed features of contracts, and we offer four organizational theories to supplement-and in some instances, perhaps, challenge-the dominant economic accounts. The purpose of this Article is threefold: first, to describe how theoretical perspectives on contracting have motivated empirical work on contracts; second, to highlight the dominant role of …
The Economics Of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through Mac Clauses In Business Combination Agreements, Robert T. Miller
The Economics Of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through Mac Clauses In Business Combination Agreements, Robert T. Miller
Working Paper Series
In any large corporate acquisition, there is a delay between the time the parties enter into a merger agreement (the signing) and the time the merger is effected and the purchase price paid (the closing). During this period, the business of one of the parties may deteriorate. When this happens to a target company in a cash deal, or to either party in a stock-for-stock deal, the counterparty may no longer want to consummate the transaction. The primary contractual protection parties have in such situations is the merger agreement’s “material adverse change” (MAC) clause. Such clauses are heavily negotiated and …
Turned On Its Head?: Norms, Freedom, And Acceptable Terms In Internet Contracting, Richard Warner
Turned On Its Head?: Norms, Freedom, And Acceptable Terms In Internet Contracting, Richard Warner
All Faculty Scholarship
Is the Internet turning contract law on its head? Many commentators contend it is. Precisely this issue arises in current controversies over end user license agreements (EULAs) and Terms of Use agreements (TOUs, the agreements governing our use of web sites). Commentators complain that, in both cases, the formation process unduly restricts buyers’ freedom; and, that sellers and web site owners exploit the process to impose terms that deprive consumers of important intellectual property and privacy rights. The courts ignore the criticisms and routinely enforce EULAs and TOUs. There is truth on both sides of this court/commentator divide. EULAs and …
Merger To Monopoly To Serve A Single Buyer: Comment, Jonathan Baker
Merger To Monopoly To Serve A Single Buyer: Comment, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
Using The Unidroit Principles To Fill Gaps In The Cisg, John Y. Gotanda
Using The Unidroit Principles To Fill Gaps In The Cisg, John Y. Gotanda
Working Paper Series
The United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) sets forth only a basic framework for the recovery of damages, thereby giving a court of tribunal broad authority to determine an aggrieved party’s loss based on circumstances of the particular case. Unfortunately, the lack of specificity has resulted in much litigation, and seemingly conflicting results. To remedy this problem, some have argued that the gaps in the CISG damages provisions should be filled with the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. In this paper, I argue that the gap-filling rules of CISG preclude the UNIDROIT Principles from being …
Colloquy, Transactional Economics: Victor Goldberg’S Framing Contract Law, Keith A. Rowley, Mark P. Gergen, Victor Goldberg, Stewart Mcaulay
Colloquy, Transactional Economics: Victor Goldberg’S Framing Contract Law, Keith A. Rowley, Mark P. Gergen, Victor Goldberg, Stewart Mcaulay
Scholarly Works
Panel discussion among law faculty who teach contracts of 2007 book authored by Victor Goldberg, which suggests that an economic approach to contract interpretation is appropriate.
Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese
Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Rendered Impracticable: Behavioral Economics And The Impracticability Doctrine, Aaron J. Wright
Rendered Impracticable: Behavioral Economics And The Impracticability Doctrine, Aaron J. Wright
Articles
No abstract provided.
The Microfoundations Of Standard Form Contracts: Price Discrimination Vs. Behavioral Bias, Jonathan Klick
The Microfoundations Of Standard Form Contracts: Price Discrimination Vs. Behavioral Bias, Jonathan Klick
All Faculty Scholarship
Standard form contracts, or contracts of adhesion, appear to provide contradictory evidence for the operation of bargaining in the markets where they are common. Non-negotiated contract terms that seemingly benefit sellers to the detriment of buyers call into question the efficiency implications of the Coase Theorem, which forms the foundation of positive law and economics. Proponents of the behavioral school of law and economics have suggested that behavioral biases, observed in experimental contexts, provide the most plausible explanation for standard form contracts. However, price discrimination might provide a more parsimonious explanation for abusive terms in contracts. If there is heterogeneity …
Credible Coercion, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar
Credible Coercion, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009
The ideal of individual liberty and autonomy requires that society provide relief against coercion. In the law, this requirement is often translated into rules that operate “post-coercion” to undo the legal consequences of acts and promises extracted under duress. This Article argues that these ex-post anti-duress measures, rather than helping the coerced party, might in fact hurt her. When coercion is credible—when a credible threat to inflict an even worse outcome underlies the surrender of the coerced party—ex post relief will only induce the strong party to execute the threatened outcome, to the detriment of the coerced party. Anti-duress relief …
"Agreeing To Disagree": Filling Gaps In Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, Omri Ben-Shahar
"Agreeing To Disagree": Filling Gaps In Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, Omri Ben-Shahar
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009
This Article develops a new standard for gap filling in incomplete contracts. It focuses on an important class of situations in which parties leave their agreement deliberately incomplete, with the intent to further negotiate and resolve the remaining issues. In these situations, neither the traditional no-enforcement result nor the usual gap filling approaches accord with the parties’ partial consent. Instead, the Article develops the concept of pro-defendant gap-fillers, under which each party is granted an option to enforce the transaction supplemented with terms most favorable (within reason) to the other party. A deliberately incomplete contract with pro-defendant gap fillers transforms …
Contract Formation In Imperfect Markets: Should We Use Mediators In Deals?, Scott R. Peppet
Contract Formation In Imperfect Markets: Should We Use Mediators In Deals?, Scott R. Peppet
Publications
This Article asks a simple question: Could third-party mediators be helpful in deals, just as they are in disputes? This Article makes a theoretical argument for such interventions, but also presents preliminary empirical evidence suggesting that transactional mediation may already be taking place.
Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure For Resolving Valuation Disputes, Keith Sharfman
Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure For Resolving Valuation Disputes, Keith Sharfman
Rutgers Law School (Newark) Faculty Papers
In this Article, Professor Sharfman addresses the problem of "discretionary valuation": that courts resolve valuation disputes arbitrarily and unpredictably, thus harming litigants and society. As a solution, he proposes the enactment of "valuation averaging," a new procedure for resolving valuation disputes modeled on the algorithmic valuation processes often agreed to by sophisticated private firms in advance of any dispute. He argues that by replacing the discretion of judges and juries with a mechanical valuation process, valuation averaging would cause litigants to introduce more plausible and conciliatory valuations into evidence and thereby reduce the cost of valuation litigation and increase the …
Transactional Mediation: Using Mediators In Deals, Scott Peppet
Transactional Mediation: Using Mediators In Deals, Scott Peppet
Publications
This article addresses whether third-party mediators could be helpful in deal-making, just as they are in resolving disputes. It makes a theoretical case for such use of mediators and presents preliminary evidence that transactional mediation already is taking place.
An Inconsistently Sensitive Mind: Richard Posner's Celebration Of Insurance Law And Continuing Blind Spots Of Econominalism, Jeffrey W. Stempel
An Inconsistently Sensitive Mind: Richard Posner's Celebration Of Insurance Law And Continuing Blind Spots Of Econominalism, Jeffrey W. Stempel
Scholarly Works
Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner is well known for bringing economic analysis to bear on a host of issues, including infamously controversial notions such the market for baby sale. Not surprisingly, Posner's insurance law opinions reflect economics, but perhaps not to the degree one would expect. A review of Posner's 20 years of opinions relating to insurance issues reviews his pragmatic jurisprudence as well. Decisions frequently reflect not only economics but also situational context and considerations of business reality as well as a sophisticated grasp of basic insurance doctrine and contract law. As a general matter, Posner also displays considerably …
“Why Infer”? What The New Institutional Economics Has To Say About Law-Supplied Default Rules, Juliet P. Kostritsky
“Why Infer”? What The New Institutional Economics Has To Say About Law-Supplied Default Rules, Juliet P. Kostritsky
Faculty Publications
A central question of contract law remains: when should the law supply a term not expressly agreed to? Many scholars have addressed that question, yet the justification for law-supplied terms often remains unconvincing. Because many proposals to supply terms do not incorporate a comparative framework for assessing the costs and benefits of legal interventions, they are incompletely justified. This Article proposes that a comparative net benefit approach (developed in institutional economics to explain private arrangements) be adapted and expanded to resolve the fundamental issues of legal intervention. The Article uses that framework to critique the hypothetical bargain and Ayres/Gertner penalty …
Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories In Merger Analysis, Jonathan Baker
Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories In Merger Analysis, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
Foreword: The Economics Of Contract Law, Michael J. Meurer
Foreword: The Economics Of Contract Law, Michael J. Meurer
Faculty Scholarship
The articles in this issue are samples from the burgeoning economics of contract law. They demonstrate that lawyers a can bring economic models to bear on quite specific issues of co offer normative guidance regarding the structure of efficient The success of the symposium and the quality of the articles of this field will continue to flourish. The articles cover a fairly narrow range of contract law issues. The second through sixth articles all address topics involving remedies. Two of these loo at the optimal remedies to be provided by contract law, and the other three are concerned with remedies …
Changing Patterns Of Water Use In The West: Pressures On The System, David H. Getches
Changing Patterns Of Water Use In The West: Pressures On The System, David H. Getches
Western Water: Expanding Uses/Finite Supplies (Summer Conference, June 2-4)
17 pages.
Afterword: Contracts And Uncertainty, Walter F. Pratt
Afterword: Contracts And Uncertainty, Walter F. Pratt
Journal Articles
This symposium reveals an unexpected irony: The very innovations designed to deal with one type of uncertainty-economic-have themselves produced another type of uncertainty-that associated with resolving disputes. This new uncertainty sounds a discordant note in the traditional refrain that contracts are legal devices for allocating risks between parties. As an afterword, this article draws together evidence from the symposium and from history to emphasize that contract is not the ideal device for allocating risks at the very time that allocation is most desired-when uncertainty is greatest. The lesson can be put in starker terms: Contract is a legal relationship and …