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Full-Text Articles in Law
Precontractual Reliance, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Omri Ben-Shahar
Precontractual Reliance, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Omri Ben-Shahar
Articles
During contractual negotiations, parties often make reliance expenditures that would increase the surplus should a contract be made. This paper analyzes decisions to invest in precontractual reliance under alternative legal regimes. Investments in reliance will be socially suboptimal in the absence of any precontractual liability-and will be socially excessive under strict liability for all reliance expenditures. Given the results for these polar cases, we focus on exploring how "intermediate"-liability rules could be best designed to induce efficient reliance decisions. One of our results indicates that the case for liability is shown to be stronger when a party retracts from terms …
An Inconsistently Sensitive Mind: Richard Posner's Celebration Of Insurance Law And Continuing Blind Spots Of Econominalism, Jeffrey W. Stempel
An Inconsistently Sensitive Mind: Richard Posner's Celebration Of Insurance Law And Continuing Blind Spots Of Econominalism, Jeffrey W. Stempel
Scholarly Works
Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner is well known for bringing economic analysis to bear on a host of issues, including infamously controversial notions such the market for baby sale. Not surprisingly, Posner's insurance law opinions reflect economics, but perhaps not to the degree one would expect. A review of Posner's 20 years of opinions relating to insurance issues reviews his pragmatic jurisprudence as well. Decisions frequently reflect not only economics but also situational context and considerations of business reality as well as a sophisticated grasp of basic insurance doctrine and contract law. As a general matter, Posner also displays considerably …
Contracting With Electronic Agents, Anthony J. Bellia
Contracting With Electronic Agents, Anthony J. Bellia
Journal Articles
Established contract doctrine provides no clear answer to the question whether exchanges arranged by the interaction of electronic agents are enforceable. This Article explores whether the law should enforce exchanges arranged by the interaction of electronic agents. It examine how normative theories of contractual obligation inform the issue, with an eye toward the strengths and weaknesses of each theory. The theories that most strongly support the enforcement of exchanges arranged by electronic agents, this Article explains, are those that ground contractual obligation in protecting the ability of individuals to pursue their reasonable objectives through reliable arrangements.