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Articles 1 - 30 of 777
Full-Text Articles in Law
Third-Party Beneficiaries Of Government Contracts: Imagining An Equitable Approach And Applying It To Broken Promises In Detroit, Gabe Chess
Michigan Law Review
Courts have widely adopted a heightened standard for recognizing third-party beneficiaries of government contracts. But the justifications offered for the heightened standard do not withstand scrutiny. Instead, courts should apply a series of equitable factors to produce results consistent with the concern for “manifest justice” that animates third-party beneficiary doctrine. Governments make contracts frequently, often to address issues of huge importance to their citizens, including housing, economic development, and healthcare. In each of these areas, third-party beneficiary doctrine may be an important avenue of relief to citizens harmed by broken promises and may encourage the government and its contracting partners …
Public Client Contingency Fee Contracts As Obligation, Seth Mayer
Public Client Contingency Fee Contracts As Obligation, Seth Mayer
Michigan Law Review
Contingency fee contracts predicate an attorney’s compensation on the outcome of a case. Such contracts are widely accepted when used in civil litigation by private plaintiffs who might not otherwise be able to afford legal representation. However, such arrangements are controversial when government plaintiffs like attorneys general and local governments retain private lawyers to litigate on behalf of the public in return for a percentage of any recovery from the lawsuit. Some commentators praise such public client contingency fee contracts, which have become commonplace, as an efficient way to achieve justice. Critics, however, view them as corrupt, undemocratic, and unethical. …
Contractual Inequality, Manisha Padi
Contractual Inequality, Manisha Padi
Michigan Law Review
Most individuals strive to satisfy every obligation laid out in standard form contracts such as mortgages, insurance plans, or credit agreements. Sophisticated parties, however, adapt and modify their obligations during contract performance by negotiating for lenient treatment and taking advantage of unclear terms. The common law explicitly authorizes variance from standardized contract terms during performance. When the same standard terms create value for sophisticated individuals and destroy value for others, the result is contractual inequality. Contractual inequality has grown without scrutiny by courts or scholars, enabling regressive redistribution of resources and creating economic inefficiency by sowing distrust in markets for …
Two Visions Of Contract, Hanoch Dagan
Two Visions Of Contract, Hanoch Dagan
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Justice in Transactions: A Theory of Contract Law. by Peter Benson.
Arbitration Waiver And Prejudice, Timothy Leake
Arbitration Waiver And Prejudice, Timothy Leake
Michigan Law Review
Arbitration agreements are common in commercial and consumer contracts. But two parties can litigate an arbitrable dispute in court if neither party seeks arbitration. That presents a problem if one party changes its mind and invokes its arbitration rights months or years after the lawsuit was filed and substantial litigation activity has taken place. Federal and state courts agree that a party can waive its arbitration rights by engaging in sufficient litigation activity without seeking arbitration, but they take different approaches to deciding how much litigation is too much. Two basic methods exist. Some courts say waiver requires the party …
Moral Diversity And Efficient Breach, Matthew A. Seligman
Moral Diversity And Efficient Breach, Matthew A. Seligman
Michigan Law Review
Most people think it is morally wrong to breach a contract. But sophisticated commercial parties, like large corporations, have no objection to breaching contracts and paying the price in damages when doing so is in their self-interest. The literature has ignored the profound legal, economic, and normative implications of that asymmetry between individuals’ and firms’ approaches to breach. To individuals, a contract is a promise that cannot be broken regardless of the financial stakes. For example, millions of homeowners refused to breach their mortgage contracts in the aftermath of the housing crisis even though doing so could have saved them …
Property, Duress, And Consensual Relationships, David Blankfein-Tabachnick
Property, Duress, And Consensual Relationships, David Blankfein-Tabachnick
Michigan Law Review
Professor Seana Valentine Shiffrin has produced an exciting new book, Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law. Shiffrin’s previous rigorous, careful, and morally sensitive work spans contract law, intellectual property, and the freedoms of association and expression. Speech Matters is in line with Shiffrin’s signature move: we ought to reform our social practices and legal and political institutions to, in various ways, address or accommodate moral values—here, a stringent moral prohibition against lying, a strident principle of promissory fidelity, that is, the principle that one ought to keep one’s promises, and the general value of veracity. The book …
Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, Omri Ben-Shahar
Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, Omri Ben-Shahar
Michigan Law Review
You have to salute Peggy Radin. She has said what others who agree with her have for so long been hesitant to utter out loud: the fine print is not a contract. There is no agreement to it, no real consent, not even “blanket assent.” It is nothing but paperwork and should have the legal fortune of junk mail. Those lengthy, unreadable pages with terms and conditions that come prepacked with consumer products or that demand to be clicked (“We Accept”) on computer screens — does anyone really think that they contain arrangements that people knowingly agreed to? How is …
Rationality's Reach, Adam B. Badawi
Rationality's Reach, Adam B. Badawi
Michigan Law Review
Economic analysis and the rational actor model have dominated contracts scholarship for at least a generation. In the past fifteen years or so, however, a group of behaviorists has challenged the ability of the rational choice model to account for consumer behavior. These behaviorists are not trying to dismantle the entire enterprise. They generally accept the fundamentals of economic analysis but argue that the rational actor model can be improved by incorporating evidence of decisionmaking flaws that people exhibit. Oren Bar-Gill has been one of the foremost and influential proponents of a behaviorist take on contracts, and his recent book, …
Personalizing Default Rules And Disclosure With Big Data, Ariel Porat, Lior Jacob Strahilevitz
Personalizing Default Rules And Disclosure With Big Data, Ariel Porat, Lior Jacob Strahilevitz
Michigan Law Review
This Article provides the first comprehensive account of personalized default rules and personalized disclosure in the law. Under a personalized approach to default rules, individuals are assigned default terms in contracts or wills that are tailored to their own personalities, characteristics, and past behaviors. Similarly, disclosures by firms or the state can be tailored so that only information likely to be relevant to an individual is disclosed and information likely to be irrelevant to her is omitted. The Article explains how the rise of Big Data makes the effective personalization of default rules and disclosure far easier than it would …
Misplaced Misrepresentations: Why Misrepresentation-Of-Age Statutes Must Be Reinterpreted As They Apply To Children’S Online Contracts, Michelle A. Sargent
Misplaced Misrepresentations: Why Misrepresentation-Of-Age Statutes Must Be Reinterpreted As They Apply To Children’S Online Contracts, Michelle A. Sargent
Michigan Law Review
The information age revolutionized the relationship between individuals and the internet. Today, children are the targets of online advertisements that lure them into accepting terms of service, thus entering into online agreements. While children may feel comfortable navigating websites, they are psychologically predisposed to be unsophisticated and impulsive actors online. Children lack the digital literacy to understand the implications of accepting website terms of service. Meanwhile, several states have misrepresentation-of-age statutes that prevent children from using the infancy doctrine to disaffirm online contracts because, in accepting the terms of service, children often represent that they are old enough to enter …
Legal Entities As Transferable Bundles Of Contracts, Kenneth Ayotte, Henry Hansmann
Legal Entities As Transferable Bundles Of Contracts, Kenneth Ayotte, Henry Hansmann
Michigan Law Review
The large, modern business corporation is frequently organized as a complex cluster of hundreds of corporate subsidiaries under the common control of a single corporate parent. Our Article provides new theory and supportive evidence to help explain this structure. We focus, in particular on the advantages of subsidiary entities in providing the option to transfer some or all of the firm's contractual rights and obligations in the future. The theory not only sheds light on corporate subsidiaries but also illuminates a basic function of all types of legal entities, from partnerships to nonprofit corporations. We show that when, as is …
Efficient Breach Of International Law: Optimal Remedies, 'Legalized Noncompliance,' And Related Issues, Eric A. Posner, Alan O. Sykes
Efficient Breach Of International Law: Optimal Remedies, 'Legalized Noncompliance,' And Related Issues, Eric A. Posner, Alan O. Sykes
Michigan Law Review
In much of the scholarly literature on international law, there is a tendency to condemn violations of the law and to leave it at that. If all violations of international law were indeed undesirable, this tendency would be unobjectionable. We argue in this Article, however that a variety of circumstances arise under which violations of international law are desirable from an economic standpoint. The reasons why are much the same as the reasons why nonperformance of private contracts is sometimes desirable- the concept of "efficient breach," familiar to modern students of contract law, has direct applicability to international law. As …
The Uncorporation And The Unraveling Of 'Nexus Of Contracts' Theory, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
The Uncorporation And The Unraveling Of 'Nexus Of Contracts' Theory, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
Michigan Law Review
A corporation is not a contract. It is a state-created entity. It has legal personhood with the right to form contracts, suffer liability for torts, and (as the Supreme Court recently decided) make campaign contributions. However, many corporate law scholars have remained wedded to the conception-metaphor, model, paradigm, what have you-of the corporation as a contract or "nexus" of contracts. The nexus of contracts theory is meant to point up the voluntary, market-oriented nature of the firm and to dismiss the notion that the corporation owes anything to the state. It is also used as a justification for preserving the …
Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan
Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan
Michigan Law Review
This Article offers experimental evidence that parties are more willing to exploit efficient-breach opportunities when the contract in question includes a liquidated-damages clause. Economists claim that the theory of efficient breach allows us to predict when parties will choose to breach a contract if the legal remedy for breach is expectation damages. However, the economic assumption of rational wealth-maximizing actors fails to capture important, shared, nonmonetary values and incentives that shape behavior in predictable ways. When interpersonal obligations are informal or underspecified, people act in accordance with shared community norms, like the moral norm of keeping promises. However, when sanctions …
Failure Of A "Basic Assumption": The Emerging Standard For Excuse Under Mae Provisions, Nathan Somogie
Failure Of A "Basic Assumption": The Emerging Standard For Excuse Under Mae Provisions, Nathan Somogie
Michigan Law Review
The onset of the current economic crisis has led many strategic and financial acquirers to reconsider the desirability of transactions to which they had previously agreed. Because many of these agreements contain substantial termination fees, buyers have increasingly sought to be excused from their contractual obligations by invoking Material Adverse Effect ("MAE") provisions. Reliance on MAE clauses as a basis for termination has historically been risky due to a lack of clarity in the case law regarding the standard for excuse under such provisions. A recent decision by the Delaware Chancery Court, Hexion v. Huntsman, the third in a …
Stipulated Damages, Super-Strict Liability, And Mitigation In Contract Law, Saul Levmore
Stipulated Damages, Super-Strict Liability, And Mitigation In Contract Law, Saul Levmore
Michigan Law Review
The remedy of expectancy damages in contract law is conventionally described as strict liability for breach. Parties sometimes stipulate damages in advance, and may agree that the damages they stipulate shall be the exclusive remedy for breach. They may do so because of their conviction that they can, even in advance, assess damages with greater accuracy than courts, and they may be wary of litigation costs associated with the postbreach determination of expectancy damages. This Article advances two claims. First, that the familiar expectation remedy is correctly understood to involve elements of fault. There is litigation over the question of …
Why Breach Of Contract May Not Be Immoral Given The Incompleteness Of Contracts, Steven Shavell
Why Breach Of Contract May Not Be Immoral Given The Incompleteness Of Contracts, Steven Shavell
Michigan Law Review
There is a widely held view that breach of contract is immoral. I suggest here that breach may often be seen as moral, once one appreciates that contracts are incompletely detailed agreements and that breach may be committed in problematic contingencies that were not explicitly addressed by the governing contracts. In other words, it is a mistake generally to treat a breach as a violation of a promise that was intended to cover the particular contingency that eventuated.
Foreword: Fault In American Contract Law, Omri Ben-Shahar, Ariel Porat
Foreword: Fault In American Contract Law, Omri Ben-Shahar, Ariel Porat
Michigan Law Review
The basic rule of liability in tort law is fault. The basic rule of liability in contract law is no fault. This is perhaps one of the most striking divides within private law, the most important difference between the law of voluntary and nonvoluntary obligations. It is this fault line (speaking equivocally) that the present Symposium explores. Is it a real divide-two opposite branches of liability within private law-or is it merely a rhetorical myth? How can it be justified? As law-and-economics scholars, this fault/no-fault divide between contract and tort is all the more puzzling. In law and economics, legal …
Let Us Never Blame A Contract Breaker, Richard A. Posner
Let Us Never Blame A Contract Breaker, Richard A. Posner
Michigan Law Review
Holmes famously proposed a "no fault" theory of contract law: a contract is an option to perform or pay, and a "breach" is therefore not a wrongful act, but merely triggers the duty to pay liquidated or other damages. I elaborate the Holmesian theory, arguing that fault terminology in contract law, such as "good faith," should be given pragmatic economic interpretations, rather than be conceived of in moral terms. I further argue that contract doctrines should normally be alterable only on the basis of empirical investigations.
In (Partial) Defense Of Strict Liability In Contract, Robert E. Scott
In (Partial) Defense Of Strict Liability In Contract, Robert E. Scott
Michigan Law Review
Many scholars believe that notions of fault should and do pervade contract doctrine. Notwithstanding the normative and positive arguments in favor of a fault-based analysis of particular contract doctrines, I argue that contract liability is strict liability at its core. This core regime is based on two key prongs: (1) the promisor is liable to the promisee for breach, and that liability is unaffected by the promisor's exercise of due care or failure to take efficient precautions; and (2) the promisor's liability is unaffected by the fact that the promisee, prior to the breach, has failed to take cost-effective precautions …
A Comparative Fault Defense In Contract Law, Ariel Porat
A Comparative Fault Defense In Contract Law, Ariel Porat
Michigan Law Review
This Article calls for the recognition of a comparative fault defense in contract law. Part I sets the framework for this defense and suggests the situations in which it should apply. These situations are sorted under two headings: cases of noncooperation and cases of overreliance. Part II unfolds the main argument for recognizing the defense and recommends applying the defense only in cases where cooperation or avoidance of overreliance is low cost.
The Role Of Fault In Contract Law: Unconscionability, Unexpected Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, And Nonperformance, Melvin Aron Eisenberg
The Role Of Fault In Contract Law: Unconscionability, Unexpected Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, And Nonperformance, Melvin Aron Eisenberg
Michigan Law Review
It is often asserted that contract law is based on strict liability, not fault. This assertion is incorrect. Fault is a basic building block of contract law, and pervades the field. Some areas of contract law, such as unconscionability, are largely fault based. Other areas, such as interpretation, include sectors that are fault based in significant part. Still other areas, such as liability for nonperformance, superficially appear to rest on strict liability, but actually rest in significant part on the fault of breaking a promise without sufficient excuse. Contract law discriminates between two types of fault: the violation of strong …
Fault In Contract Law, Eric A. Posner
Fault In Contract Law, Eric A. Posner
Michigan Law Review
A promisor is strictly liable for breaching a contract, according to the standard account. However, a negligence-based system of contract law can be given an economic interpretation, and this Article shows that such a system is in some respects more attractive than the strict-liability system. This may explain why, as a brief discussion of cases shows, negligence ideas continue to play a role in contract decisions.
The Fault That Lies Within Our Contract Law, George M. Cohen
The Fault That Lies Within Our Contract Law, George M. Cohen
Michigan Law Review
Scholars and courts typically describe and defend American contract law as a system of strict liability, or liability without fault. Strict liability generally means that the reason for nonperformance does not matter in determining whether a contracting party breached. Strict liability also permeates the doctrines of contract damages, under which the reason for the breach does not matter in determining the measure of damages, and the doctrines of contract formation, under which the reason for failing to contract does not matter In my Article, I take issue with the strict liability paradigm, as I have in my prior work on …
An Information Theory Of Willful Breach, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar
An Information Theory Of Willful Breach, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar
Michigan Law Review
Should willful breach be sanctioned more severely than inadvertent breach? Strikingly, there is sharp disagreement on this matter within American legal doctrine, in legal theory, and in comparative law. Within law-and-economics, the standard answer is "no "-breach should be subject to strict liability. Fault should not raise the magnitude of liability in the same way that no fault does not immune the breaching party from liability. In this paper, we develop an alternative law-and-economics account, which justifies supercompensatory damages for willful breach. Willful breach, we argue, reveals information about the "true nature" of the breaching party-that he is more likely …
Willfulness Versus Expectation: A Promisor-Based Defense Of Willful Breach Doctrine, Steve Thel, Peter Siegelman
Willfulness Versus Expectation: A Promisor-Based Defense Of Willful Breach Doctrine, Steve Thel, Peter Siegelman
Michigan Law Review
Willful breach doctrine should be a major embarrassment to contract law. If the default remedy for breach is expectation damages designed to put the injured promisee in the position she would have been in if the contract had been performed, then the promisor's behavior-the reason for the breach-looks to be irrelevant in assessing damages. And yet the cases are full of references to "willful" breaches, which seem often to be treated more harshly than ordinary ones based on the promisor's bad/willful conduct. Our explanation is that willful breaches are best understood as those that should be prevented or deterred because …
Fault At The Contract-Tort Interface, Roy Kreitner
Fault At The Contract-Tort Interface, Roy Kreitner
Michigan Law Review
The formative period in the history of contract and tort (in the second half of the nineteenth century) may be characterized by the cleavage of contract and tort around the concept of fault: tort modernized by moving from strict liability to a regime of "no liability without fault," while contract moved toward strict liability. The opposing attitudes toward fault are puzzling at first glance. Nineteenth-century scholars of private law offered explanations for the opposition, reasoning that alternative ideas about fault account for the different character of state involvement in enforcing private law rights: tort law governs liabilities imposed by law …
Could Breach Of Contract Be Immoral?, Seana Shiffrin
Could Breach Of Contract Be Immoral?, Seana Shiffrin
Michigan Law Review
Some scholars defend the contract law's ban on punitive damage awards on the grounds that breach of contract, in itself, is not morally wrong. In this Article, I offer two responses. First, I refute one prevalent argument of Steven Shavell's in support of this view. Shavell argues that contractual breach is not immoral in those cases in which the legal regime would offer expectation damages because the contracting parties would not have agreed to require performance had they explicitly deliberated about the circumstances occasioning the breach. I criticize his argument for failing to justify this hypothetical-contract approach and, in any …
The Fault Principle As The Chameleon Of Contract Law: A Market Function Approach, Stefan Grundmann
The Fault Principle As The Chameleon Of Contract Law: A Market Function Approach, Stefan Grundmann
Michigan Law Review
This Article begins with a comparative law survey showing that all legal systems do not opt exclusively for fault liability or strict liability in contract law, but often adopt a more nuanced approach. This approach includes intermediate solutions such as reversing the burden of proof, using a market ("objective") standard of care, distinguishing between different types of contracts, and providing a "second chance" to breaching parties. Taking this starting point seriously and arguing that it is highly unlikely that all legal systems err, this Article argues that the core question is how and when each liability regime should prevail or …