Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- CEOs (1)
- Chief executive officers -- United States -- Salaries wages etc. (1)
- Clauses (Law) (1)
- Coaches' pay (1)
- Coase Theorem (1)
-
- Coasian standard (1)
- Collapsing illusions (1)
- College football (1)
- College football coaches -- Salaries wages etc. (1)
- Contract negotiations (1)
- Contracts (1)
- Contracts -- United States -- Standards (1)
- Contractual defaults (1)
- Covenants not to compete (1)
- Divison I football (1)
- Economics -- United States (1)
- Empirical majoritarian standard (1)
- Executive compensation -- United States (1)
- Hypothetical majoritarian standard (1)
- Labor contracts -- United States (1)
- Majoritarianism (1)
- Overpaid and unfairly treated (1)
- Party-oriented standard (1)
- Pay for performance (1)
- Rules (1)
- Sales contracts -- United States (1)
- Setting efficient contract defaults (1)
- Theoretical majoritarian standard (1)
- Transaction costs (1)
- Uniform Commercial Code (1)
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Law
Collapsing Illusions: Standards For Setting Efficient Contract And Other Defaults, Steven J. Burton
Collapsing Illusions: Standards For Setting Efficient Contract And Other Defaults, Steven J. Burton
Indiana Law Journal
In this Essay, Professor Burton analyzes and evaluates four commonly used standards for setting efficient default rules and standards. Based on two theoretical insights, he shows that three of them collapse upon analysis into the fourth, a Coasian standard that turns out to be a dead end. The theoretical upshot is that the Coase Theorem often is a good reason to use defaults rather than mandatory rules or standards. But neither the theorem nor reference to a transaction-costless world sustains particular defaults. To set an efficient default, the law should guide courts toward supplying terms that parties should have adopted …
College Football Coaches’ Pay And Contracts: Are They Overpaid And Unfairly Treated?, Randall Thomas, Lawrence Van Horn
College Football Coaches’ Pay And Contracts: Are They Overpaid And Unfairly Treated?, Randall Thomas, Lawrence Van Horn
Indiana Law Journal
College football coaches’ employment contracts and compensation garner public attention and scrutiny in much the same way as those of corporate CEOs. In both cases, the public perception is that they must be overpaid and pampered. Economic theory claims that for coaches and CEOs to be overpaid, they must be receiving compensation in excess of the value they create for their organizations. However, both receive pay-for-performance compensation, which structurally aligns their compensation with value creation. This means we need to examine the underlying structure of the contract that gives rise to the observed compensation to determine whether they are appropriately …