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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Law Of Duress And The Economics Of Credible Threats, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar
The Law Of Duress And The Economics Of Credible Threats, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar
Articles
This paper argues that enforcement of an agreement, reached under a threat to refrain from dealing, should be conditioned solely on the threat's credibility. When a credible threat exists, enforcement promotes social welfare and the threatened party's interests. If agreements backed by credible threats were not enforceable, the threatening party would not extort them and would instead refrain from deaing-to the threatened party's detriment. The doctrine of duress, which invalidates such agreements, hurts the coerced party. By denying enforcement when a credible threat exists, the duress doctrine precludes the threatened party from making the commitment necessary to reach agreement. Paradoxically, …
Precontractual Reliance, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Omri Ben-Shahar
Precontractual Reliance, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Omri Ben-Shahar
Articles
During contractual negotiations, parties often make reliance expenditures that would increase the surplus should a contract be made. This paper analyzes decisions to invest in precontractual reliance under alternative legal regimes. Investments in reliance will be socially suboptimal in the absence of any precontractual liability-and will be socially excessive under strict liability for all reliance expenditures. Given the results for these polar cases, we focus on exploring how "intermediate"-liability rules could be best designed to induce efficient reliance decisions. One of our results indicates that the case for liability is shown to be stronger when a party retracts from terms …
The Public Policy Of Contracts To Will Future Acquired Property, Joseph H. Drake
The Public Policy Of Contracts To Will Future Acquired Property, Joseph H. Drake
Articles
The general subject of wills upon consideration seems to have given courts and jurists a good deal of trouble, not only in England and America, but also in the continental countries. The Code Napoleon appears in terms actually to prohibit the making of reciprocal or mutual wills in the same instrument.