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Full-Text Articles in Law
Contract Exposition And Formalism, Gregory Klass
Contract Exposition And Formalism, Gregory Klass
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Formalism in contract law has had many defenders and many critics. What courts need, however, is an account of when formalist approaches work and when they do not. This article addresses that need by developing a general theory of the rules of contract interpretation and construction—contract “exposition.” The theory distinguishes inter alia two forms of formalism. Formalities effect legal change by virtue of their form alone, and thereby obviate interpretation. Examples from contract law include “as is”, the seal and boilerplate terms. Formalities work when parties intend their legal effects, that is, when they perform juristic acts. Plain meaning rules, …
The Importance Of Being Standard, Anna Gelpern
The Importance Of Being Standard, Anna Gelpern
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Contract standardisation in the sovereign debt market saves time and money in preparing documents and endows widely-used terms with a shared public meaning, which in turn saves investors the costs of acquiring information, facilitates secondary market trading and reduces the scope for mistakes in the judicial interpretation of contract terms. Sovereign debt issuers and investors claim to value standardisation and list it as an important contractual objective. Issuers generally insist that their bond contracts are standard and reflect market practice. Variations from past practice and market norm must be explained in disclosure documents and through market outreach. Standardisation is not …
The Rules Of The Game And The Morality Of Efficient Breach, Gregory Klass
The Rules Of The Game And The Morality Of Efficient Breach, Gregory Klass
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Moralists have long criticized the theory of efficient breach for its advocacy of promise breaking. But a fully developed theory of efficient breach has an internal morality of its own. It argues that sophisticated parties contract for efficient breach, which in the long run maximizes everyone’s welfare. And the theory marks some breaches—those that are opportunistic, obstructive, or otherwise inefficient—as wrongs that the law should deter, as transgressions that should not be priced but punished. That internal morality, however, does not excuse the theory from moral scrutiny. An extended comparison to Jean Renoir’s 1939 film, La Règle du Jeu (“The …