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Full-Text Articles in Law
Contracts Meet Henry Ford, Barak D. Richman
Contracts Meet Henry Ford, Barak D. Richman
Faculty Scholarship
Legal scholars and legal educators view contracts as a welfare-maximizing (or optimal risk-allocating) device for two or more parties. Because we cling to this principal-driven paradigm, we think of lawyers only as the proverbial “transaction cost engineers,” the loyal agents of parties to a transaction. And whenever we observe contracts that appear to be suboptimal, we blame agency costs. We instead should apply the literature on organizational economics to understand the production of contracts by the modern law firm. This literature better illustrates how law firms organize, why they produce the products they do, and why those products sometimes exhibit …
Economic Organization In The Construction Industry: A Case Study Of Collaborative Production Under High Uncertainty, William A. Klein, Mitu Gulati
Economic Organization In The Construction Industry: A Case Study Of Collaborative Production Under High Uncertainty, William A. Klein, Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.