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Contracts

Brigham Young University Law School

2023

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Hidden Contracts, Shmuel I. Becher, Uri Benoliel Dec 2023

Hidden Contracts, Shmuel I. Becher, Uri Benoliel

BYU Law Review

Transparency is a promising means for enhancing democratic values, countering corruption, and reducing power abuse. Nonetheless, the potential of transparency in the domain of consumer contracts is untapped. This Article suggests utilizing the power of transparency to increase consumer access to justice, better distribute technological gains between businesses and consumers, and deter sellers from breaching their consumer contracts while exploiting consumers’ inferior position.

In doing so, this Article focuses on what we dub “Hidden Contracts.” Part I conceptualizes the idea of hidden contracts. It first defines hidden contracts as consumer form contracts that firms unilaterally modify and subsequently remove from …


Contracting As A Class, Caleb N. Griffin May 2023

Contracting As A Class, Caleb N. Griffin

BYU Law Review

Contract law is stuck in a loop of path dependency and stale precedent. Its metaphors, like “the meeting of the minds,” are today laughably implausible. Its values, like “consent,” have been stripped of any real meaning. No one reads or understands the overwhelming majority of contracts to which they agree. And no one should. Reading them is meaningless, because it simply does not matter what they say. Individuals must agree to them – indeed, are effectively forced to agree to them – if they wish to participate in the modern world.

Modern digital contracting is not a collaborative process. Today, …


Scaling Daos Through Fiduciary Duties, Alex Dolphin Jan 2023

Scaling Daos Through Fiduciary Duties, Alex Dolphin

BYU Law Review

DAOs (Decentralized Autonomous Organizations) are a unique type of business organization due in large part to their directly democratic governance structure. Owners of DAOs, “tokenholders,” do not delegate control to a board or a general partner. Rather, tokenholders directly control a DAO and must approve every action that a DAO takes. Because tokenholders do not delegate control to an agent, the principal-agent problem is tempered in DAOs. The principal-agent problem is the basis for the fiduciary duties that govern traditional business organizations. These fiduciary duties are meant to prevent agents entrusted with power by their principals from self-dealing. Some have …