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In (Partial) Defense Of Strict Liability In Contract, Robert E. Scott
In (Partial) Defense Of Strict Liability In Contract, Robert E. Scott
Michigan Law Review
Many scholars believe that notions of fault should and do pervade contract doctrine. Notwithstanding the normative and positive arguments in favor of a fault-based analysis of particular contract doctrines, I argue that contract liability is strict liability at its core. This core regime is based on two key prongs: (1) the promisor is liable to the promisee for breach, and that liability is unaffected by the promisor's exercise of due care or failure to take efficient precautions; and (2) the promisor's liability is unaffected by the fact that the promisee, prior to the breach, has failed to take cost-effective precautions …
An Information Theory Of Willful Breach, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar
An Information Theory Of Willful Breach, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar
Michigan Law Review
Should willful breach be sanctioned more severely than inadvertent breach? Strikingly, there is sharp disagreement on this matter within American legal doctrine, in legal theory, and in comparative law. Within law-and-economics, the standard answer is "no "-breach should be subject to strict liability. Fault should not raise the magnitude of liability in the same way that no fault does not immune the breaching party from liability. In this paper, we develop an alternative law-and-economics account, which justifies supercompensatory damages for willful breach. Willful breach, we argue, reveals information about the "true nature" of the breaching party-that he is more likely …
Foreword: Fault In American Contract Law, Omri Ben-Shahar, Ariel Porat
Foreword: Fault In American Contract Law, Omri Ben-Shahar, Ariel Porat
Michigan Law Review
The basic rule of liability in tort law is fault. The basic rule of liability in contract law is no fault. This is perhaps one of the most striking divides within private law, the most important difference between the law of voluntary and nonvoluntary obligations. It is this fault line (speaking equivocally) that the present Symposium explores. Is it a real divide-two opposite branches of liability within private law-or is it merely a rhetorical myth? How can it be justified? As law-and-economics scholars, this fault/no-fault divide between contract and tort is all the more puzzling. In law and economics, legal …
Willfulness Versus Expectation: A Promisor-Based Defense Of Willful Breach Doctrine, Steve Thel, Peter Siegelman
Willfulness Versus Expectation: A Promisor-Based Defense Of Willful Breach Doctrine, Steve Thel, Peter Siegelman
Michigan Law Review
Willful breach doctrine should be a major embarrassment to contract law. If the default remedy for breach is expectation damages designed to put the injured promisee in the position she would have been in if the contract had been performed, then the promisor's behavior-the reason for the breach-looks to be irrelevant in assessing damages. And yet the cases are full of references to "willful" breaches, which seem often to be treated more harshly than ordinary ones based on the promisor's bad/willful conduct. Our explanation is that willful breaches are best understood as those that should be prevented or deterred because …
When Is A Willful Breach "Willful"? The Link Between Definitions And Damages, Richard Craswell
When Is A Willful Breach "Willful"? The Link Between Definitions And Damages, Richard Craswell
Michigan Law Review
The existing literature on willful breach has not been able to define what should count as "willful." I argue here that any definition we adopt has implications for just how high damages should be raised in those cases where a breach qualifies as willful. As a result, both of these issues-the definition of "willful," and the measure of damages for willful breach-need to be considered simultaneously. Specifically, if a definition of "willful" excludes all breachers who behaved efficiently, then in theory we can raise the penalty on the remaining inefficient breachers to any arbitrarily high level ("throw the book at …