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Full-Text Articles in Law
Potential Competitive Effects Of Vertical Mergers: A How-To Guide For Practitioners, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley
Potential Competitive Effects Of Vertical Mergers: A How-To Guide For Practitioners, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The purpose of this short article is to aid practitioners in analyzing the competitive effects of vertical and complementary product mergers. It is also intended to assist the agencies if and when they undertake revision of the 1984 U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines. Those Guidelines are out of date and do not reflect current enforcement or economic thinking about the potential competitive effects of vertical mergers. Nor do they provide the tools needed to carry out a modern competitive effects analysis. This article is intended to partially fill the gap by summarizing the various potential competitive harms and benefits that can …
Antitrust Merger Efficiencies In The Shadow Of The Law, D. Daniel Sokol, James A. Fishkin
Antitrust Merger Efficiencies In The Shadow Of The Law, D. Daniel Sokol, James A. Fishkin
D. Daniel Sokol
This Essay provides an overview of U.S. antitrust merger practice in addressing efficiencies both in terms of actual practice before the agencies and in scholarly work as a response to Jamie Henikoff Moffitt's Vanderbilt Law Review article Merging in the Shadow of the Law: The Case for Consistent Judicial Efficiency Analysis. Moffitt’s analysis could have benefited from a more thorough discussion of the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s (collectively, the “agencies”) analysis of efficiencies during investigations and the broader process of negotiations involving mergers. For instance, the article does not discuss the empirical work addressing when the agencies …
An Impossible Reconciliation? Understanding Class-Action Waivers And Arbitration After American Express V. Italian Colors, Kristine A. Bergman
An Impossible Reconciliation? Understanding Class-Action Waivers And Arbitration After American Express V. Italian Colors, Kristine A. Bergman
Kristine A Bergman
No abstract provided.
The Tempting Of Antitrust: Robert Bork And The Goals Of Antitrust Policy, Daniel A. Crane
The Tempting Of Antitrust: Robert Bork And The Goals Of Antitrust Policy, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Of all Robert Bork’s many important contributions to antitrust law, none was more significant than his identification of economic efficiency, disguised as consumer welfare, as the sole normative objective of U.S. antitrust law. The Supreme Court relied primarily on Bork’s argument that Congress intended the Sherman Act to advance consumer welfare in making its landmark statement in Reiter v. Sonotone that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’” This singular normative vision proved foundational to the reorientation of antitrust law away from an interventionist, populist, Brandeisian, and vaguely Jeffersonian conception of antitrust law as a constraint on …