Law Commons^™

Anticompetitive Mergers In Labor Markets, Ioana Marinescu, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Indiana Law Journal

Mergers of competitors are conventionally challenged under the federal antitrust laws when they threaten to lessen competition in some product or service market in which the merging firms sell. In many of these cases the threat is that in concentrated markets—those with only a few sellers—the merger increases the likelihood of collusion or collusion-like behavior. The result will be that the post-merger firm will reduce the volume of sales in the affected market and prices will rise.

Mergers can also injure competition in markets in which the firms purchase, however. Although that principle is widely recognized, very few litigated cases …

Brooke Group Ltd. V. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.: A Victory For Consumer Welfare Under The Robinson-Patman Act, Keith Allen May

University of Richmond Law Review

The preservation of competition among business entities is vital to the success of any economy. Recognizing the importance of competition, the United States Congress has passed antitrust laws that seek to enhance productivity and protect consumers. Although the antitrust laws, like all statutes, are vulnerable to a variety of different interpretations, "[t]he language of the antitrust statutes, their legislative histories, the major structural features of the antitrust law, and considerations of the scope, nature, consistency, and ease of administration of the law all indicate that the law should be guided solely by the criterion of consumer welfare." The antitrust laws …

Buyer Liability Under Section 2(F) Of The Robinson-Patman Act, Douglas E. Ray

University of Richmond Law Review

Despite the fact that the 1936 Robinson-Patman Act amendments to the Clayton Act were enacted in an attempt to curb the ability of large businesses to coerce sellers of products into granting them discriminatory price advantages over smaller purchasers, only one section of the Act, section 2(f) which prohibits the knowing inducement or receipt of discriminatory prices, is aimed at buyers. The remainder of the Act is directed toward sellers. Liability under section 2(f) is generally derivative in nature, being based on a preliminary finding of seller liability under another section of the Act. Because of this derivative nature of …

Antitrust And The Consumer Interest, Kenneth S. Carlston, James M. Treece

Michigan Law Review

Public control of business in the United States has proceeded, in most sectors of the economy, on the assumption that free, open competition in the market should be the primary regulator. It is felt that consumer welfare will be maximized by such an organization of the economy. Courts, governmental agencies, and, to a certain extent, private agencies have performed the role of ensuring that free markets are not displaced by other, less desirable alternatives.

Tying Arrangements Under The Antitrust Laws: The "Integrity Of The Product" Defense, F. Bruce Kulp Jr.

Michigan Law Review

One of the most frequently asserted defenses to an action under either the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act against a tying arrangement-a contractual limitation imposed by a manufacturer whereby the purchaser of the "tying product" agrees to purchase a related "tied product" only from the manufacturer of the tying product-has been that the tying was necessary to protect the good will or the integrity of the tying product. Whether the tied product is service for the tying product, another component in a system in which the tying product is used, repair parts for the tying product, or any other …