Law Commons^™

Taking It With You: Platform Barriers To Entry And The Limits Of Data Portability, Gabriel Nicholas

Michigan Technology Law Review

Policymakers are faced with a vexing problem: how to increase competition in a tech sector dominated by a few giants. One answer proposed and adopted by regulators in the United States and abroad is to require large platforms to allow consumers to move their data from one platform to another, an approach known as data portability. Facebook, Google, Apple, and other major tech companies have enthusiastically supported data portability through their own technical and political initiatives. Today, data portability has taken hold as one of the go-to solutions to address the tech industry’s competition concerns.

This Article argues that despite …

Why Intra-Brand Dealer Competition Is Irrelevant To The Price Effects Of Tesla's Vertical Integration, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

"In recent years, Tesla Motors (recently renamed Tesla) has been engaged in a state-by-state ground way for the right to distribute it’s all-electric vehicles directly to consumers. The car dealers' lobby, with the political backing of General Motors, has fiercely battled back, relying on decades-old state dealer protection laws to argue that Tesla is legally bound to distribute through franchised dealers. Through a combination of favorable state legislative and judicial decisions, Tesla has won the right to distribute directly in many states, but remains categorically barred from direct distribution in important states like Michigan and Texas--and hence all direct distribution …

Tesla And The Car Dealers' Lobby, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Tesla Motors, the offspring of entrepreneur Elon Musk (who brought us Pay-Pal and SpaceX), is the most exciting automotive development in many decades and a marquee story of American technological dynamism and innovation. The company’s luxury electric cars have caused a sensation in the auto industry, including a review by Consumer Reports calling Tesla’s Model S the best car it ever tested. Despite the acclaim, Tesla faces enormous challenges Despite the acclaim, Tesla faces enormous challenges in penetrating an automotive market that has been dominated for a century by internal combustion engines. Not only must it build cars that customers …

Tying And Consumer Harm, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Brantley raises important issues of law, economics, and policy about tying arrangements. Under current legal principles, Brantley was on solid ground in distinguishing between anticompetitive ties and those that might harm consumer interests without impairing competition. As a matter of economics, the court was also right to reject the claim that the cable programmers forced consumers to pay for programs the customers didn’t want. The hardest question is a policy one - whether antitrust law should ever condemn the exploitation of market power in ways that extract surplus from consumers but do not create or enlarge market power. I shall …

Why Governance Might Work In Mutual Funds, Michael C. Schouten

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Jones v. Harris Associates L.P. has highlighted the potential for agency conflicts in mutual funds, whose advisors have the de facto power to award themselves high fees. While the surrounding debate has focused on the extent to which market competition replaces the need for fee litigation, there appears to be a growing consensus that fund governance, through the use of voice, is unlikely to be effective. The use of voice is commonly said to be hampered by collective action problems. More recently, scholars have argued that it is further weakened by the easy availability …

Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, Daniel A. Crane, Joshua D. Wright

Articles

Since we abhor suspense, we will quickly answer the question our title poses: No. As a general matter, bundled discounting schemes lower prices to consumers unless they are predatory—that is to say, unless they exclude rivals and thereby permit the bundled discounter to price free of competitive restraint. The corollary of this observation is that bundled discounting is generally pro-competitive and pro-consumer and should only be condemned when it is capable of excluding rivals. We pose and answer this question because it is at the heart of Section VI of Professor Elhauge’s provocative draft article which is the subject of …

The Distinction Between The Scope Of Section 2(A) And Sections 2(D) And 2€ Of The Robinson-Patman Act, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that sections 2(d) and 2(e) were meant to cover only disguised discriminations not within the scope of section 2(a). If the seller's conduct falls within the scope of section 2(a), that section must be applied regardless of whether or not the conduct also falls within the language of section 2(d) or 2(e). Only when section 2(a) does not apply is recourse available under sections 2(d) and 2(e). Part I of this Note looks at general antitrust policy, the limitations of the Clayton Act that led to the enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act, and the legislative history of …

Price Discrimination Law And Economic Efficiency, Edward H. Cooper

Articles

The Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act (15 U.S.C. § 13), undertakes to outlaw price "discrimination" upon proof of threatened injury to competition, and subject to specified defenses. Lawyers often bewail the fact that administration of this statute frequently fails to conform to an economist's notion of discrimination. For the most part, the complaints are addressed to the clear fact that, as drafted and interpreted, the statute wreaks unnecessary damage. In the name of protecting competition, competition and economic efficiency are often curtailed.

Government And The Consumer, Richard J. Barber

Michigan Law Review

This article takes up four major topics. First, the principal characteristics of governmental action with respect to consumer protection are reviewed, with emphasis on developments during the past thirty years. Second, the traditional pleas for consumer protection are examined with a view toward determining the inadequacies in governmental action. Third, the problems of the consumer are studied in the context of oligopolistic industrial markets in which nonprice competition accentuates the place of advertising and severely restricts the dissemination of factual information that is essential to enlightened purchase decisions. Fourth, the ingredients of a meaningful consumer protection program are outlined and …

Federal Trade Commission Regulation Of Advertising, Earl W. Kintner

Michigan Law Review

The success of an economic democracy, no less than that of a political democracy, depends upon informed, intelligent choice. Thus, the widespread dissemination of information with respect to alternatives is imperative; otherwise, choices would be made in a vacuum and would become meaningless, if not plainly capricious. However, there is no paucity of information in our contemporary society; the so-called "mass media" ensure that. Indeed, modern man can hardly escape, even if he should so desire, the constant bombardment of information from television, radio, newspapers, billboards, and other sources.

Tying Arrangements Under The Antitrust Laws: The "Integrity Of The Product" Defense, F. Bruce Kulp Jr.

Michigan Law Review

One of the most frequently asserted defenses to an action under either the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act against a tying arrangement-a contractual limitation imposed by a manufacturer whereby the purchaser of the "tying product" agrees to purchase a related "tied product" only from the manufacturer of the tying product-has been that the tying was necessary to protect the good will or the integrity of the tying product. Whether the tied product is service for the tying product, another component in a system in which the tying product is used, repair parts for the tying product, or any other …